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Strategic Behavior in Multi-Alternative Elections: A Review of Some Experimental Evidence

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  • Thomas A. Rietz

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  • Thomas A. Rietz, 1993. "Strategic Behavior in Multi-Alternative Elections: A Review of Some Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 1026, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert Forsythe, 1990. "An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Way Elections," Discussion Papers 927, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Forsythe, R. & Myerson, R. & Rietz, T. & Weber, R., 1991. "An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories," Working Papers 91-31, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
    3. Samuel Merrill, 1981. "Strategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 115-134, January.
    4. Niemi, Richard G., 1984. "The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 952-958, December.
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