IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/recosp/reco_pr2_0084.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Ce que le vote par approbation révèle des préférences des électeurs français

Author

Listed:
  • Isabelle Lebon
  • Antoinette Baujard
  • Frédéric Gavrel
  • Herrade Igersheim
  • Jean-François Laslier

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to determine a distribution along a political axis of the candidates for the 2012 French presidential election on the basis of the opinions of voters, rather than on a priori ideological positions.?To do so, experimental data from a voting experiment on approval voting are used.?The obtained endogenous axis representative of the political landscape corresponds to a fairly standard left-right axis.?However, a more precise analysis of the behavior of voters questions the unimodality assumption of political preferences usually associated with this structure.?Voters often simultaneously approve candidates on both sides of the political spectrum but without supporting intermediary candidates on the axis; besides, this attitude is more common among men than women. Classification JEL : C93, D72.

Suggested Citation

  • Isabelle Lebon & Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier, 2017. "Ce que le vote par approbation révèle des préférences des électeurs français," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 68(6), pages 1063-1076.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_pr2_0084
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_PR2_0084
    Download Restriction: free
    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2017-6-page-1063.htm
    Download Restriction: free
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader Rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 113-136, January.
    2. Niemi, Richard G., 1984. "The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 952-958, December.
    3. Laslier, Jean-François, 2006. "Spatial Approval Voting," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 160-185, April.
    4. Igerseim, Herrade & Baujard, Antoinette & Laslier, Jean-François, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 151-189, Mars-Juin.
    5. Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver, 2010. "Introduction to the Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 1-12, Springer.
    6. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate," Post-Print hal-00363218, HAL.
    7. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
    8. Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-02839-7, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antoinette Baujard & Isabelle Lebon, 2020. "Retelling the Story of the 2017 French Presidential Election: The contribution of Approval Voting," Working Papers halshs-02926773, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Isabelle Lebon & Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "Ce que le vote par approbation révèle des préférences des électeurs français," Working Papers halshs-01409106, HAL.
    2. Isabelle Lebon & Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "Ce que le vote par approbation révèle des préférences des électeurs français," PSE Working Papers halshs-01409106, HAL.
    3. Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
    4. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
    5. François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matias Nunez, 2019. "Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games," Working Papers halshs-02049865, HAL.
    6. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2016. "Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 559-587, October.
    7. Igerseim, Herrade & Baujard, Antoinette & Laslier, Jean-François, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 151-189, Mars-Juin.
    8. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes, 2019. "Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 388-401.
    9. Herrade Igersheim & Antoinette Baujard & Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," Working Papers halshs-01402275, HAL.
    10. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    11. Benoît R. Kloeckner, 2022. "Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 423-466, August.
    12. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
    13. Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2015. "Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory," Working Papers halshs-01168767, HAL.
    14. Duddy, Conal, 2014. "Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 14-16.
    15. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
    16. Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 285-305.
    17. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01304688 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01136390 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Su, Francis Edward & Zerbib, Shira, 2019. "Piercing numbers in approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 65-71.
    20. Núñez, Matías & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2017. "Implementation via approval mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 169-181.
    21. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester, 2023. "The rationalizability of survey responses," Economics Working Papers 1863, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    22. Tanguiane, Andranick S., 2022. "Analysis of the 2021 Bundestag elections. 4/4. The third vote application," Working Paper Series in Economics 154, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_pr2_0084. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.