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The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting

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  • Lehtinen, Aki

Abstract

This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting by comparing the utilitarian efficiencies obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility-maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. Under approval voting utilitarian efficiency is relatively high irrespective of the behavioural assumption, and under the plurality rule strategic voting significantly increases utilitarian efficiency.

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  • Lehtinen, Aki, 2008. "The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 688-704, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:3:p:688-704
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Aki Lehtinen, 2009. "Intentions in invisible-hand accounts," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 409-416.
    2. Güth, Werner & Vittoria Levati, M. & Montinari, Natalia, 2014. "Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 206-221.
    3. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
    4. Aki Lehtinen, 2015. "Strategic Voting and the Degree of Path-Dependence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 97-114, January.
    5. Eckert, Daniel & Klamler, Christian, 2010. "An equity-efficiency trade-off in a geometric approach to committee selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 386-391, September.
    6. Aki Lehtinen, 2011. "A welfarist critique of social choice theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(3), pages 359-381, July.

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