Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Marcel Boyer & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Competition and Access in Electricity Markets: ECPR, Global Price Cap, and Auctions," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-41, CIRANO.
- Kell, Nicholas P. & Santibanez-Borda, Ernesto & Morstyn, Thomas & Lazakis, Iraklis & Pillai, Ajit C., 2023. "Methodology to prepare for UK’s offshore wind Contract for Difference auctions," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 336(C).
- Fabian Ocker & Karl‐Martin Ehrhart & Marion Ott, 2018. "Bidding strategies in Austrian and German balancing power auctions," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(6), November.
- Mo Xiao & Zhe Yuan, 2022.
"License Complementarity and Package Bidding: US Spectrum Auctions,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 420-464, November.
- Mo Xiao & Zhe Yuan, 2018. "License Complementarity and Package Bidding: The U.S. Spectrum Auctions," Working Papers 18-06, NET Institute.
- Mitridati, Lesia & Kazempour, Jalal & Pinson, Pierre, 2021. "Design and game-Theoretic analysis of community-Based market mechanisms in heat and electricity systems," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
- Macatangay, Rafael Emmanuel A., 1998. "Space-time prices of wholesale electricity in England and Wales," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 163-188, November.
- Ly Sugianto, 2014. "Navigating Towards a Sustainable Electricity Supply in Indonesia," Modern Applied Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(6), pages 1-14, December.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
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