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Competition and Access in Electricity Markets: ECPR, Global Price Cap, and Auctions

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  • Marcel Boyer
  • Jacques Robert

Abstract

In this paper, we first review in this paper some general principles and fundamental facts and issues which remain at the heart of the movement towards deregulation, restructuring and privatization in network industries in general and in the electricity industry in particular. We then proceed with a discussion of a set of basic procedures through which competition can be introduced in electricity markets, that is the access pricing rules. We compare the efficient component pricing rule with the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing rule and we discuss the global price cap rule. We finally discuss some real world experiences (UK and Canada) and we present some recent ideas on network access auctions as a possible approach to increasing competition with soft or light-handed regulation. We conclude by raising some issues which have been relatively neglected but remain nevertheless important. Dans cet article, nous passons d'abord en revue certains principes, faits et enjeux pertinents aux mouvements de déréglementation, de restructuration et de privatisation dans les industries-réseaux en général et au secteur de l'électricité en particulier. Nous procédons ensuite à la discussion d'un ensemlbe de mécanismes par lesquels la concurrence peut être développée dans les marchés de l'électrcicité, notamment les règles et les prix d'accès. Nous comparons la règle de tarification efficace des composants et la règle de Ramsey-Boiteux et nous discutons la règle des prix plafonds globaux. Nous présentons ensuite quelques éléments importants des réformes vécues au Royaume-Uni et au Canada. Nous abordons enfin la possibilité que des enchères sur les droits d'accès aux réseaux puissent permettre d'accroître la concurrence en ne0501ntenant qu'une réglementation légère. Nous concluons en rappelant certains enjeux importants0501s négligés dans les débats actuels.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Competition and Access in Electricity Markets: ECPR, Global Price Cap, and Auctions," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-41, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:97s-41
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    References listed on IDEAS

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