IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/3226.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Joint Crowdout: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Federal Grants on State Government Expenditures and Charitable Donations

Author

Listed:
  • Lawrence B. Lindsey
  • Richard Steinberg

Abstract

We estimate the effect of exogenous federal expenditure cutbacks on state social service expenditures and on charitable donations. In the process, we also estimate tax and income effects and explore the impact of community environment and "need" variables. Data consist of a unique three-year panel of aggregate itemized giving by state and income class and government expenditures by state. Our results confirm the 'flypaper effect' of federal grants on state spending and show statistically significant but partial crowdout of charitable donations. The flypaper effects appears to dominate the crowdout of donations, so that federal grants are especially productive of overall social service expenditures. Finally, we find that the state's poverty rate is a particularly strong and positive determinant of charitable giving.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence B. Lindsey & Richard Steinberg, 1990. "Joint Crowdout: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Federal Grants on State Government Expenditures and Charitable Donations," NBER Working Papers 3226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3226
    Note: PE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w3226.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hamilton, Bruce W., 1983. "The flypaper effect and other anomalies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 347-361, December.
    2. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    3. Howard R. Bowen, 1943. "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 58(1), pages 27-48.
    4. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 789-793, September.
    5. Steven Craig & Robert P. Inman, 1986. "Education, Welfare and the "New" Federalism: State Budgeting in a Federalist Public Economy," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in State and Local Public Finance, pages 187-228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Roberts, Russell D, 1984. "A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 136-148, February.
    7. Feldstein, Martin S & Taylor, Amy, 1976. "The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(6), pages 1201-1222, November.
    8. Moffitt, Robert A., 1984. "The effects of grants-in-aid on state and local expenditures : The case of AFDC," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 279-305, April.
    9. Burton Abrams & Mark Schitz, 1978. "The ‘crowding-out’ effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 29-39, March.
    10. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    11. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    12. Paqué, Karl-Heinz, 1982. "Do public transfers "crowd out" private charitable giving? Some econometric evidence for the Federal Republic of Germany," Kiel Working Papers 152, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    13. Stephen Long, 1976. "Social pressure and contributions to health charities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 55-66, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gruber, Jonathan & Hungerman, Daniel M., 2007. "Faith-based charity and crowd-out during the great depression," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 1043-1069, June.
    2. Richard STEINBERG, 1991. "Does Government Spending Crowd Out Donations?," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 591-612, October.
    3. Cynthia Benzing & Thomas Andrews, 2004. "The effect of tax rates and uncertainty on contributory crowding out," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(3), pages 201-215, September.
    4. Douglas Noonan, 2007. "Fiscal pressures, institutional context, and constituents: a dynamic model of states’ arts agency appropriations," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 31(4), pages 293-310, December.
    5. Thomas Garrett & Russell Rhine, 2010. "Government growth and private contributions to charity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 103-120, April.
    6. Francesca Borgonovi & Michael O'Hare, 2004. "The Impact of the National Endowment for the Arts in the United States: Institutional and Sectoral Effects on Private Funding," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 28(1), pages 21-36, February.
    7. Arthur C. Brooks, 2003. "Do Government Subsidies To Nonprofits Crowd Out Donations or Donors?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 31(2), pages 166-179, March.
    8. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell M. Rhine, 2007. "Does government spending really crowd out charitable contributions? new time series evidence," Working Papers 2007-012, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dennis Coates, 1998. "Public Sector Crowding Out of Private Provision of Public Goods: the Influence of Differences in Production Costs," Public Finance Review, , vol. 26(5), pages 460-479, September.
    2. Behrens, Christoph & Emrich, Eike & Hämmerle, Martin & Pierdzioch, Christian, 2017. "Match quality, crowding out, and crowding in: Empirical evidence for German sports clubs," Working Papers of the European Institute for Socioeconomics 21, European Institute for Socioeconomics (EIS), Saarbrücken.
    3. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena, 1998. "An experimental test of the crowding out hypothesis: The nature of beneficent behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 315-331, November.
    4. Tomáš Sigmund, 2015. "Vztah etického a ekonomického chování [The relationship of ethical and economic behaviour]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2015(2), pages 223-243.
    5. Garth Heutel, 2014. "Crowding Out and Crowding In of Private Donations and Government Grants," Public Finance Review, , vol. 42(2), pages 143-175, March.
    6. Backus, Peter, 2010. "Is charity a homogeneous good?," Economic Research Papers 270773, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    7. Zachary Halberstam & James R. Hines Jr., 2023. "Quality-Aware Tax Incentives for Charitable Contributions," CESifo Working Paper Series 10250, CESifo.
    8. Huseyin Yildirim & Alvaro Name Correa, 2011. "A Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising with Costly Solicitations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000222, David K. Levine.
    9. Backus, Peter, 2010. "Is charity a homogeneous good?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 951, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    10. Cynthia Benzing & Thomas Andrews, 2004. "The effect of tax rates and uncertainty on contributory crowding out," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(3), pages 201-215, September.
    11. Name Correa, Álvaro, 2014. "Learning by Fund-raising," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1408, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    12. Claudia Keser & Andreas Markstädter & Martin Schmidt, 2014. "Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public-good provision," CIRANO Working Papers 2014s-47, CIRANO.
    13. Duncan, Brian, 1999. "Modeling charitable contributions of time and money," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 213-242, May.
    14. Nyborg, Karine & Rege, Mari, 2003. "Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 397-418, June.
    15. Keser, Claudia & Markstädter, Andreas & Schmidt, Martin, 2017. "Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public-good provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 291-310.
    16. Yamamoto, Wataru, 2013. "Negative economic consequences of ethical campaigns?: Market data evidence," MPRA Paper 49070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Lee, Kangoh, 2008. "Voluntary contributions and local public goods in a federation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 163-176, January.
    18. James R. Baumgardner, 1993. "Tests of Median Voter and Political Support Maximization Models: the Case of Federal/State Welfare Programs," Public Finance Review, , vol. 21(1), pages 48-83, January.
    19. Serge-Christophe Kolm, 2008. "Paradoxes of the War on Poverty: Warm-Glows and Efficiency," IDEP Working Papers 0807, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 18 Nov 2008.
    20. Arthur M. Diamond, 1999. "Does Federal Funding “Crowd In” Private Funding Of Science?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(4), pages 423-431, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3226. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.