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Tests of Median Voter and Political Support Maximization Models: the Case of Federal/State Welfare Programs

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  • James R. Baumgardner

    (Duke University)

Abstract

Empirical tests of basic formulations of a median voter approach versus a political support maximization approach to state government decision making are conducted in this article. Refutable empirical implications are rigorously developed from the theoretical models and are tested with data on welfare programs for which there is both a state and a federal component. The programs analyzed include both an in-kind program (Medicaid) and a cash transfer program (AFDC). Efficient esti mates are produced by using a systemwide approach in the estimation. The results favor the use of political support models that include altruistic motives on the part of taxpayers. Empirical estimates indicate that a state's welfare generosity per poor person falls with the total number of poor, rises with the total number of nonpoor, and rises with the strength of a relevant producer group.

Suggested Citation

  • James R. Baumgardner, 1993. "Tests of Median Voter and Political Support Maximization Models: the Case of Federal/State Welfare Programs," Public Finance Review, , vol. 21(1), pages 48-83, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:21:y:1993:i:1:p:48-83
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219302100103
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Celeste K. Carruthers & Marianne H. Wanamaker, 2015. "Municipal Housekeeping: The Impact of Women's Suffrage on Public Education," NBER Working Papers 20864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. José Cruz, 2001. "An empirical application of the median voter model and of the interest group influence model to the Portuguese and Galician municipalities," ERSA conference papers ersa01p25, European Regional Science Association.
    3. José Manuel Cruz, 2004. "Empirical analysis of the influence of voters and politicians in the public choice of Portuguese municipalities universidade portucalense," ERSA conference papers ersa04p367, European Regional Science Association.
    4. Rui Nuno Baleiras, 2001. "To fragment or to consolidate jurisdictions: the optimal architecture of government," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp401, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    5. Kangoh Lee, 2007. "Does Mobility Undermine Income Redistribution? A Political-Support Approach to Redistribution in a Federation," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 63(2), pages 186-210, June.

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