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When Is Tinkering with Safety Net Programs Harmful to Beneficiaries?

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  • Jeffrey Clemens
  • Michael J. Wither

Abstract

Interactions between redistributive policies can confront low-income households with complicated choices. We study one such interaction, namely the relationship between Medicaid eligibility thresholds and the minimum wage. A minimum wage increase reduces the number of hours a low-skilled individual can work while retaining Medicaid eligibility. We show that the empirical and welfare implications of this interaction can depend crucially on the relevance of labor market frictions. Absent frictions, affected workers may maintain Medicaid eligibility through small reductions in hours of work. With frictions, affected workers may lose Medicaid eligibility unless they leave their initial job. Empirically, we find that workers facing this scenario became less likely to participate in Medicaid, less likely to work, and more likely to spend time looking for new jobs, including search while employed. The observed outcomes suggest that low-skilled workers face substantial labor market frictions. Because adjustment is costly, tinkering with safety net program parameters that determine the location of program eligibility notches can be harmful to beneficiaries.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Clemens & Michael J. Wither, 2021. "When Is Tinkering with Safety Net Programs Harmful to Beneficiaries?," NBER Working Papers 29028, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Neumark & William Wascher, 2006. "Minimum Wages and Employment: A Review of Evidence from the New Minimum Wage Research," NBER Working Papers 12663, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    5. Adams, Camilla & Meer, Jonathan & Sloan, CarlyWill, 2022. "The minimum wage and search effort," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    6. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Wojciech Kopczuk, 2011. "Transfer Program Complexity and the Take-Up of Social Benefits," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 54-90, February.
    7. Courtemanche, Charles & Marton, James & Ukert, Benjamin & Yelowitz, Aaron & Zapata, Daniela, 2018. "Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Behaviors after Three Years," IZA Discussion Papers 11468, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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    Cited by:

    1. Adams, Camilla & Meer, Jonathan & Sloan, CarlyWill, 2022. "The minimum wage and search effort," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    2. Clemens, Jeffrey, 2016. "The Low-Skilled Labor Market from 2002 to 2014: Measurement and Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 75690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Jonathan Meer & Joshua Witter, 2022. "Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit for Childless Adults: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 37, pages 175-198, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Hampton, Matt & Totty, Evan, 2023. "Minimum wages, retirement timing, and labor supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    5. David Neumark, 2024. "The effects of minimum wages on (almost) everything? A review of recent evidence on health and related behaviors," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 38(1), pages 1-65, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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