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How Costly is Turnover? Evidence from Retail

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  • Peter J. Kuhn
  • Lizi Yu

Abstract

We estimate turnover costs in small retail sales teams using daily sales data and an advance notice requirement to address endogeneity concerns. In addition to short-staffing and onboarding costs, we identify two less familiar sources of turnover costs: incumbent workers’ recruitment activities, and reductions in team morale after a departure is announced. Our estimates of total turnover costs are relatively modest, however: Ten percent higher turnover is about as costly as a 0.6% wage increase. We attribute these low costs to a set of complementary personnel policies which ensure that only 25 percent of departures result in a short-staffing spell.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter J. Kuhn & Lizi Yu, 2019. "How Costly is Turnover? Evidence from Retail," NBER Working Papers 26179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26179
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    Cited by:

    1. Danielle Li & Lindsey R. Raymond & Peter Bergman, 2020. "Hiring as Exploration," NBER Working Papers 27736, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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