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Complements or Substitutes? Examining the Relationship between Teamwork and Selection Intensity

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  • Bayo-Moriones, Alberto

    (University of Navarra)

  • Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique

    (Universidad Pública de Navarra)

  • Martinez-de-Morentin, Sara

    (Universidad Pública de Navarra)

Abstract

Teamwork has become widely embraced in recent decades; however, its adoption carries significant implications that require thorough understanding. In this paper, we study the relationship between teamwork and selection intensity. The use of teams may increase the value of investing in comprehensive selection, as it facilitates the identification of workers with complementary skills. However, teamwork may also substitute intensive selection if team members engage in mutual monitoring and peer reporting. Using data from a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing plants, we find a significant and negative association between selection intensity and teamwork that is aligned with the mutual monitoring hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Bayo-Moriones, Alberto & Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique & Martinez-de-Morentin, Sara, 2024. "Complements or Substitutes? Examining the Relationship between Teamwork and Selection Intensity," IZA Discussion Papers 16876, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16876
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    teamwork; selection intensity; mutual monitoring; HRM complementarity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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