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The Evidence from California on the Economic Impact of Inefficient Distribution Network Pricing

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  • Frank A. Wolak

Abstract

Charging full requirements customers for distribution network services using the traditional cents per kilowatt-hour (KWh) price creates economic incentives for consumers to invest in distributed generation technologies, such as rooftop solar photovoltaics, despite the fact that marginal cost of grid-supplied electricity is lower. This paper first assesses the economic efficiency properties of this approach to transmission and distribution network pricing and whether current approach to distribution network pricing implies that full-requirement customers cross-subsidize distributed solar customers. Using data on quarterly residential distribution network prices and distributed solar installations from California’s three largest investor-owned utilities I find that larger amounts of distributed solar capacity and more geographically concentrated solar capacity predict higher distribution network prices and average distribution network costs. This result continues to hold even after controlling for average distribution network costs for the utility, Using these econometric model estimates, I find that 2/3 of the increase in residential distribution network prices for each of the three utilities between 2003 and 2016 can attributed to the growth distributed solar capacity. The paper then investigates the extent of the legal obligation that distributed solar generation customers have to pay for sunk costs of investments in the transmission and distribution networks. The paper closes with a description of an alternative approach to distribution network pricing that is likely to increase the economic signals for efficient electricity consumption and the incentive for cost effective installation of distributed solar generation capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank A. Wolak, 2018. "The Evidence from California on the Economic Impact of Inefficient Distribution Network Pricing," NBER Working Papers 25087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25087
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Severin Borenstein, 2017. "Private Net Benefits of Residential Solar PV: The Role of Electricity Tariffs, Tax Incentives, and Rebates," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(S1), pages 85-122.
    2. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-977, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Oshiro, Asahi & Tarui, Nori, 2023. "Effects of alternative pricing structures on electricity consumption and payments in the commercial and industrial sector," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    2. Abajian, Alexander & Pretnar, Nick, 2021. "An Aggregate Perspective on the Geo-spatial Distribution of Residential Solar Panels," MPRA Paper 105481, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ansarin, Mohammad & Ghiassi-Farrokhfal, Yashar & Ketter, Wolfgang & Collins, John, 2020. "The economic consequences of electricity tariff design in a renewable energy era," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 275(C).
    4. Yihsu Chen & Andrew L. Liu & Makoto Tanaka & Ryuta Takashima, 2022. "Optimal Retail Tariff Design with Prosumers: Pursuing Equity at the Expenses of Economic Efficiencies?," Papers 2209.14505, arXiv.org.
    5. Brown, David P. & Sappington, David E.M., 2020. "Motivating the optimal procurement and deployment of electric storage as a transmission asset," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    6. Boampong, Richard & Brown, David P., 2020. "On the benefits of behind-the-meter rooftop solar and energy storage: The importance of retail rate design," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    7. Bistline, John & Blanford, Geoffrey & Mai, Trieu & Merrick, James, 2021. "Modeling variable renewable energy and storage in the power sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    8. Peter Cappers & Andrew Satchwell & Will Gorman & Javier Reneses, 2019. "Financial Impacts of Net-Metered Distributed PV on a Prototypical Western Utility’s Shareholders and Ratepayers," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(24), pages 1-19, December.
    9. Ansarin, Mohammad & Ghiassi-Farrokhfal, Yashar & Ketter, Wolfgang & Collins, John, 2022. "A review of equity in electricity tariffs in the renewable energy era," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    10. McRae, Shaun D. & Wolak, Frank A., 2021. "Retail pricing in Colombia to support the efficient deployment of distributed generation and electric stoves," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    11. Brown, David P. & Sappington, David E. M., 2023. "Designing Incentive Regulation in the Electricity Sector," Working Papers 2023-10, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q02 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - Commodity Market
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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