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L'analyse théorique des problèmes de tarification et d'allocation des coûts dans les télécommunications

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  • David Encaoua
  • Michel Moreaux

Abstract

[eng] The theoretical approach to pricing and cost allocation for telecommunication services. . This paper reviews some economie principles concerning pricing policy and cost allocating methods in telecommunications. It focuses on the links between sustainable market price equilibria and public pricing rules. The first part is devoted to questions of allocative efficiency and equity. Allocative efficiency is investigated under the second best analysis framework, while equity is related to the search af some cross subsidy free prices. Average cost pricing rules in the case of multi-product activities are also investigated. The second part is devoted to properties of non uniform prices and gives some numerical simulations of welfare gains associated to different pricing rules. [fre] L'analyse théorique des problèmes de tarification et d'allocation des coûts dans les télécommunications. . Cet article passe en revue un certain nombre de principes de calcul économique appliqués aux problèmes de tarification et d'allocation des coûts dans le cadre des services de télécommunication. Les liens entre équilibres de marché et propriétés des tarifs publics optimaux servent de toile de fond à l'analyse. La première partie traite de la compatibilité entre les objectifs d'efficacité allocative, d'une part, et d'équité, d'autre part. L'efficacité allocative est examinée dans le cadre de l'optimum de second rang, tandis que l'équité, conçue comme une tarification ne comportant pas de transferts de recettes d'un service à un autre, est analysée à travers le formalisme des jeux de coûts et des jeux de surplus. L'axiomatique des coûts moyens généralisés, dans le cas d'une activité multiservices, ainsi que les propriétés de tarification correspondante, sont également présentées. La deuxième partie de l'article traite des principes de tarification non uniforme et présente quelques simulations numériques permettant d'évaluer les gains de surplus associés à chaque type de tarification.

Suggested Citation

  • David Encaoua & Michel Moreaux, 1987. "L'analyse théorique des problèmes de tarification et d'allocation des coûts dans les télécommunications," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(2), pages 375-414.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1987_num_38_2_408983
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