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Mutual Assistance between Federal Reserve Banks, 1913-1960 as Prolegomena to the TARGET2 Debate

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  • Barry Eichengreen
  • Arnaud J. Mehl
  • Livia Chițu
  • Gary Richardson

Abstract

This paper reconstructs the forgotten history of mutual assistance among Reserve Banks in the early years of the Federal Reserve System. We use data on accommodation operations by the 12 Reserve Banks between 1913 and 1960 which enabled them to mutualise their gold reserves in emergency situations. Gold reserve sharing was especially important in response to liquidity crises and bank runs. Cooperation among reserve banks was essential for the cohesion and stability of the US monetary union. But fortunes could change quickly, with emergency recipients of gold turning into providers. Because regional imbalances did not grow endlessly, instead narrowing when region-specific liquidity shocks subsided, mutual assistance created only limited tensions. These findings speak to the current debate over TARGET2 balances in Europe.

Suggested Citation

  • Barry Eichengreen & Arnaud J. Mehl & Livia Chițu & Gary Richardson, 2014. "Mutual Assistance between Federal Reserve Banks, 1913-1960 as Prolegomena to the TARGET2 Debate," NBER Working Papers 20267, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20267
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    Cited by:

    1. Barry Eichengreen, 2014. "Doctrinal determinants, domestic and international of Federal Reserve policy, 1914-1933," Globalization Institute Working Papers 195, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    2. Eisenschmidt, Jens & Kedan, Danielle & Schmitz, Martin & Adalid, Ramón & Papsdorf, Patrick, 2017. "The Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme and TARGET balances," Occasional Paper Series 196, European Central Bank.
    3. Ivo Maes & Rebeca Gomez Betancourt, 2018. "Paul van Zeeland and the First Decade of the US Federal Reserve System: the Analysis from a European Central Banker who was a Student of Kemmerer," HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2018(2), pages 5-32.
    4. Schelkle, Waltraud, 2018. "The political economy of monetary solidarity: revisiting the Euro experiment," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90201, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Luigi Pierfranco Campiglio, 2015. "Employment and the “Investment Gap”: An Econometric Model of European Imbalances," DISCE - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0071, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    6. Waltraud Schelkle, 2018. "The political economy of monetary solidarity: revisiting the euro experiment," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 44(3), pages 371-403.
    7. Alexander L. Wolman, 2013. "Federal Reserve Interdistrict Settlement," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 2Q, pages 117-141.
    8. Chmielewski Tomasz & Sławiński Andrzej, 2019. "Lessons from TARGET2 imbalances: The case for the ECB being a lender of last resort," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 5(2), pages 48-63, June.

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    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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