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The Great Pyramids of America: A Revised History of US Business Groups, Corporate Ownership and Regulation, 1930-1950

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  • Eugene Kandel
  • Konstantin Kosenko
  • Randall Morck
  • Yishay Yafeh

Abstract

Most listed firms are freestanding in the U.S, while listed firms in other countries often belong to business groups: lasting structures in which listed firms control other listed firms. Hand-collected historical data illuminate how the present ownership structure of the United States arose: (1) Until the mid-20th century, US corporate ownership was unexceptional: large pyramidal groups dominated many industries; (2) About half of these resembled groups elsewhere today in being industrially diversified and family controlled; but the others were tightly focused and had widely held apex firms; (3) US business groups disappeared gradually, primarily in the 1940s, and by 1950 were largely gone; Their demise took place against growing concerns that they posed a threat to competition and even to society; (4) The data link the disappearance of business groups to reforms that targeted them explicitly – the Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935) and rising intercorporate dividend taxation (after 1935), or indirectly – enhanced investor protection (after 1934), the Investment Company Act (1940) and escalating estate taxes. Banking reforms and rejuvenated antitrust enforcement may have indirectly contributed too. These reforms, sustained in a lasting anti-big business climate, promoted the dissolution of existing groups and discouraged the formation of new ones. Thus, a multi-pronged reform agenda, sustained by a supportive political climate, created an economy of freestanding firms.

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  • Eugene Kandel & Konstantin Kosenko & Randall Morck & Yishay Yafeh, 2013. "The Great Pyramids of America: A Revised History of US Business Groups, Corporate Ownership and Regulation, 1930-1950," NBER Working Papers 19691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19691
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    2. Aldunate, Felipe & González, Felipe & Prem, Mounu & Urzúa, Francisco, 2020. "Privatization and business groups: Evidence from the Chicago Boys in Chile," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    3. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2017. "East Asian Financial and Economic Development," Working Papers id:12112, eSocialSciences.
    4. Gur Aminadav & Elias Papaioannou, 2020. "Corporate Control around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 1191-1246, June.
    5. Ashish Arora & Sharon Belenzon & Andrea Patacconi & Jungkyu Suh, 2020. "The Changing Structure of American Innovation: Some Cautionary Remarks for Economic Growth," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 39-93.
    6. Flannery, Mark J. & Hanousek, Jan & Shamshur, Anastasiya & Tresl, Jiri, 2023. "M&A Activity and the Capital Structure of Target Firms," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(5), pages 2064-2095, August.
    7. Hannah, Leslie & Kasuya, Makoto, 2015. "Twentieth century enterprise forms: Japan in comparative perspective," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64489, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Luis Alfonso Dau & Randall Morck & Bernard Yin Yeung, 2021. "Business groups and the study of international business: A Coasean synthesis and extension," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(2), pages 161-211, March.
    9. Carlo Cristiano & Maria Cristina Marcuzzo & Eleonora Sanfilippo, 2018. "Taming the great depression: Keynes’s personal investments in the US stock market, 1931–1939," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 35(1), pages 13-40, April.
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    11. Cho, Duksang, 2019. "Pyramidal Business Groups and Asymmetric Financial Frictions," KDI Journal of Economic Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI), vol. 41(3), pages 1-38.
    12. Ronald W. Masulis & Peter K. Pham & Jason Zein, 2020. "Family Business Group Expansion Through IPOs: The Role of Internal Capital Markets in Financing Growth While Preserving Control," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5191-5215, November.
    13. Michela Altieri & Giovanna Nicodano, 2016. "The Apparent Diversification Discount," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 465, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • P12 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Enterprises

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