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Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding in America?

In: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers

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  • Marco Becht
  • J. Bradford DeLong

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, 2005. "Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding in America?," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 613-666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10278
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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
    2. Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2013. "Dynastic Management," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 971-996, January.
    3. Carola Frydman & Eric Hilt, 2014. "Investment Banks as Corporate Monitors in the Early 20th Century United States," NBER Working Papers 20544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Randall Morck & Lloyd Steier, 2005. "The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 1-64, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Carney, Richard, 2007. "Farmers and Capitalism," MPRA Paper 5148, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Yafeh, Yishay & Kandel, Eugene & ,, 2013. "The Great Pyramids of America: A Revised History of US Business Groups, Corporate Ownership and Regulation, 1930-1950," CEPR Discussion Papers 9759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Marianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, 2008. "Politics-Business Interaction Paths," Working Papers in Public Economics 109, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    8. Randall Morck, 2005. "How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 19, pages 135-179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala & Winnie Fung, 2005. "Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership Concentration," NBER Working Papers 11469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Jean Helwege & Christo Pirinsky & René M. Stulz, 2007. "Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(3), pages 995-1028, June.
    11. Mazumdar, Surajit, 2008. "Crony Capitalism: Caricature or Category?," MPRA Paper 19626, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Yoser Gadhoum, 2006. "Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(2), pages 179-204, May.
    13. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2009. "Never Waste a Good Crisis: An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 145-179, November.
    14. HANNAH, Leslie, 2018. "Corporate Governance, Accounting Transparency and Stock Exchange Sizes in Germany, Japan and “Anglo-Saxon” Economies, 1870-1950," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-77, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    15. Jürgen Wandel, 2011. "Business groups and competition in post-Soviet transition economies: The case of Russian “agroholdings”," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 403-450, December.
    16. Henrekson, Magnus & Jakobsson, Ulf, 2011. "The Swedish Corporate Control Model: Convergence, Persistence or Decline?," Working Paper Series 857, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    17. Hilt, Eric, 2008. "When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 645-685, September.
    18. Carney Richard, 2011. "The Domestic Political Origins of Global Financial Standards: The Agrarian Roots of American Securities Regulations," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-41, October.
    19. Mario García Molina, 2011. "Esquema para el análisis de la estructura de un grupo económico," Documentos de Trabajo, Escuela de Economía 7957, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
    20. Morck, Randall & Yeung, Bernard, 2004. "Special issues relating to corporate governance and family control," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3406, The World Bank.
    21. Leslie Hannah, 2007. "What did Morgan's Men really do?," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-465, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    22. Mario García Molina, 2010. "Crisis y diversificación de los grupos empresariales colombianos a finales de los noventa," Documentos de Trabajo, Escuela de Economía 7571, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.

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