Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding in America?
In: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers
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- Randall Morck, 2011.
"Finance and Governance in Developing Economies,"
Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
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"Dynastic Management,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 971-996, January.
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- Caselli, Francesco & Gennaioli, Nicola, 2006. "Dynastic management," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3558, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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- Carola Frydman & Eric Hilt, 2014. "Investment Banks as Corporate Monitors in the Early 20th Century United States," NBER Working Papers 20544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Randall K. Morck & Lloyd Steier, 2005. "The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction," NBER Working Papers 11062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carney, Richard, 2007. "Farmers and Capitalism," MPRA Paper 5148, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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"The Great Pyramids of America: A Revised History of US Business Groups, Corporate Ownership and Regulation, 1930-1950,"
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- Eugene Kandel & Konstantin Kosenko & Randall Morck & Yishay Yafeh, 2013. "The Great Pyramids of America: A Revised History of US Business Groups, Corporate Ownership and Regulation, 1930-1950," NBER Working Papers 19691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, 2008.
"Politics-Business Interaction Paths,"
Working Papers in Public Economics
109, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
- Marianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, 2009. "Politics-Business Interaction Paths," CESifo Working Paper Series 2883, CESifo.
- Randall Morck, 2005.
"How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy,"
NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 19, pages 135-179,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Randall Morck, 2004. "How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups - The Double Taxation of Inter-Corporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy," NBER Working Papers 10944, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Morck, Randall, 2006. "How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double Taxation of Inter-corporate Dividends and other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy," CEI Working Paper Series 2005-15, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala & Winnie Fung, 2005. "Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership Concentration," NBER Working Papers 11469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jean Helwege & Christo Pirinsky & René M. Stulz, 2007.
"Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(3), pages 995-1028, June.
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- Jean Helwege & Christo Pirinsky & René M. Stulz, 2005. "Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the ynamics of Corporate Ownership," NBER Working Papers 11505, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mazumdar, Surajit, 2008. "Crony Capitalism: Caricature or Category?," MPRA Paper 19626, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yoser Gadhoum, 2006. "Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(2), pages 179-204, May.
- Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2009.
"Never Waste a Good Crisis: An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance,"
Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 145-179, November.
- Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2009. "Never Waste a Good Crisis: An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 15042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- HANNAH, Leslie, 2018. "Corporate Governance, Accounting Transparency and Stock Exchange Sizes in Germany, Japan and “Anglo-Saxon” Economies, 1870-1950," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-77, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Jürgen Wandel, 2011. "Business groups and competition in post-Soviet transition economies: The case of Russian “agroholdings”," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 403-450, December.
- Henrekson, Magnus & Jakobsson, Ulf, 2011. "The Swedish Corporate Control Model: Convergence, Persistence or Decline?," Working Paper Series 857, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Hilt, Eric, 2008.
"When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century,"
The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 645-685, September.
- Eric Hilt, 2007. "When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century," NBER Working Papers 13093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carney Richard, 2011. "The Domestic Political Origins of Global Financial Standards: The Agrarian Roots of American Securities Regulations," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-41, October.
- Mario García Molina, 2011. "Esquema para el análisis de la estructura de un grupo económico," Documentos de Trabajo, Escuela de Economía 7957, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
- Morck, Randall & Yeung, Bernard, 2004. "Special issues relating to corporate governance and family control," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3406, The World Bank.
- Leslie Hannah, 2007. "What did Morgan's Men really do?," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-465, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Mario García Molina, 2010. "Crisis y diversificación de los grupos empresariales colombianos a finales de los noventa," Documentos de Trabajo, Escuela de Economía 7571, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
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