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Professionals Do Not Play Minimax: Evidence from Major League Baseball and the National Football League

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Listed:
  • Kenneth Kovash
  • Steven D. Levitt

Abstract

Game theory makes strong predictions about how individuals should behave in two player, zero sum games. When players follow a mixed strategy, equilibrium payoffs should be equalized across actions, and choices should be serially uncorrelated. Laboratory experiments have generated large and systematic deviations from the minimax predictions. Data gleaned from real-world settings have been more consistent with minimax, but these latter studies have often been based on small samples with low power to reject. In this paper, we explore minimax play in two high stakes, real world settings that are data rich: choice of pitch type in Major League Baseball and whether to run or pass in the National Football League. We observe more than three million pitches in baseball and 125,000 play choices for football. We find systematic deviations from minimax play in both data sets. Pitchers appear to throw too many fastballs; football teams pass less than they should. In both sports, there is negative serial correlation in play calling. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that correcting these decision making errors could be worth as many as two additional victories a year to a Major League Baseball franchise, and more than a half win per season for a professional football team.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth Kovash & Steven D. Levitt, 2009. "Professionals Do Not Play Minimax: Evidence from Major League Baseball and the National Football League," NBER Working Papers 15347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15347
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Spenkuch, Jörg, 2014. "Backward Induction in the Wild: Evidence from the U.S. Senate," MPRA Paper 58766, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Leonidas Spiliopoulos, 2018. "Randomization and serial dependence in professional tennis matches: Do strategic considerations, player rankings and match characteristics matter?," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 13(5), pages 413-427, September.
    3. Sean Duffy & J. J. Naddeo & David Owens & John Smith, 2024. "Cognitive Load and Mixed Strategies: On Brains and Minimax," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 26(03), pages 1-34, September.
    4. Vivek Bhattacharya & Greg Howard, 2022. "Rational Inattention in the Infield," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 348-393, November.
    5. Lopez Michael J., 2020. "Bigger data, better questions, and a return to fourth down behavior: an introduction to a special issue on tracking datain the National football League," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 73-79, June.
    6. Benjamin Williams & Will Palmquist & Ryan Elmore, 2023. "Simulation-based decision making in the NFL using NFLSimulatoR," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 325(1), pages 731-742, June.
    7. Paserman, M. Daniele, 2023. "Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environments? Evidence from Professional Tennis Players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 590-609.
    8. Emara, Noha & Owens, David & Smith, John & Wilmer, Lisa, 2017. "Serial correlation in National Football League play calling and its effects on outcomes," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 125-132.
    9. Jared Quenzel & Paul Shea, 2016. "Predicting the Winner of Tied National Football League Games," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(7), pages 661-671, October.
    10. Michael William Gmeiner, 2019. "History-Dependent Mixed Strategies: Evidence From Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(3), pages 371-398, April.
    11. Snyder Kevin & Lopez Michael, 2015. "Consistency, accuracy, and fairness: a study of discretionary penalties in the NFL," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 219-230, December.
    12. Jim Downey & Joseph McGarrity, 2019. "Pressure and the ability to randomize decision-making: The case of the pickoff play in Major League Baseball," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 47(3), pages 261-274, September.
    13. repec:cup:judgdm:v:13:y:2018:i:5:p:413-427 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Heifetz, Aviad & Heller, Ruth & Ostreiher, Roni, 2021. "Do Arabian babblers play mixed strategies in a “volunteer’s dilemma”?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    15. Urschel John D & Zhuang Jun, 2011. "Are NFL Coaches Risk and Loss Averse? Evidence from Their Use of Kickoff Strategies," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 7(3), pages 1-17, July.
    16. Etan A. Green & Justin M. Rao & David Rothschild, 2019. "A Sharp Test of the Portability of Expertise," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 2820-2831, June.
    17. Jan Lennartsson & Nicklas Lidström & Carl Lindberg, 2015. "Game Intelligence in Team Sports," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(5), pages 1-28, May.
    18. He, Yinghua, 2012. "Gaming the Boston School Choice Mechanism in Beijing," TSE Working Papers 12-345, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    19. Christopher Cotton & Chang Liu, 2010. "100 Horsemen and the Empty City: A Game Theoretic Exploration of Deception in Chinese Military Legend," Working Papers 2010-22, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    20. Lefgren, Lars J. & Platt, Brennan & Price, Joseph & Higbee, Samuel, 2019. "Outcome based accountability: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 121-137.
    21. Romain Gauriot & Lionel Page & John Wooders, 2016. "Nash at Wimbledon: Evidence from Half a Million Serves," QuBE Working Papers 046, QUT Business School.
    22. Emara, Noha & Owens, David & Smith, John & Wilmer, Lisa, 2014. "Minimax on the gridiron: Serial correlation and its effects on outcomes in the National Football League," MPRA Paper 58907, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Romain Gauriot & Lionel Page & John Wooders, 2016. "Nash at Wimbledon: Evidence from Half a Million Serves," QuBE Working Papers 046, QUT Business School.

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    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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