IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/10834.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF

Author

Listed:
  • Michael D. Bordo
  • Ashoka Mody
  • Nienke Oomes

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the IMF's role in maintaining the access of emerging market economies to international capital markets. We find evidence that both macroeconomic aggregates and capital flows improve following the adoption of an IMF program, although they may initially deteriorate somewhat. Consistent with theoretical predictions and earlier empirical findings, we find that IMF programs are most successful in improving capital flows to countries with bad, but not very bad fundamentals. In such countries, IMF programs are also associated with improvements in the fundamentals themselves.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael D. Bordo & Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes, 2004. "Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF," NBER Working Papers 10834, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10834
    Note: IFM
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10834.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lerrick, Adam & Meltzer, Allan H., 2003. "Blueprint for an international lender of last resort," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 289-303, January.
    2. Paul R. Masson & Michael Mussa, 1995. "Long-term tendencies in budget deficits and debt," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 5-55.
    3. Bordo Michael D. & Kydland Finn E., 1995. "The Gold Standard As a Rule: An Essay in Exploration," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 423-464, October.
    4. Bordo, Michael D. & Rockoff, Hugh, 1996. "The Gold Standard as a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval”," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 389-428, June.
    5. Michael Hutchison, 2003. "A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Currency Crises and the Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs," NBER Chapters, in: Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 321-359, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, 2003. "Sovereign risk, credibility and the gold standard: 1870-1913 versus 1925-31," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 241-275, April.
    7. Bordo, Michael D. & Schwartz, Anna J., 2000. "Measuring real economic effects of bailouts: historical perspectives on how countries in financial distress have fared with and without bailouts," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 81-167, December.
    8. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
    9. Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 2000. "Sovereign Liquidity Crises: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 335-362, January.
    10. Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong-Wha, 2005. "IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1245-1269, October.
    11. Marchesi, Silvia & Thomas, Jonathan P, 1999. "IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages 111-125, March.
    12. Guillermo A. Calvo, 1998. "CAPITAL FLOWS AND CAPITAL-MARKET CRISES: The Simple Economics of Sudden Stops," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(1), pages 35-54, November.
    13. Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro, 2003. "Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1041-1063, December.
    14. Dani Rodrik, 1995. "Why is there Multilateral Lending?," NBER Working Papers 5160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Zlata Hajro & Joseph Joyce, 2009. "A true test: do IMF programs hurt the poor?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(3), pages 295-306.
    16. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2004. "The Catalytic Effect of Lending by the International Financial Institutions," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: International Finance and the Developing Economies, chapter 12, pages 204-226, Palgrave Macmillan.
    17. International Monetary Fund, 1998. "Do IMF-Supported Programs Work? A Survey of the Cross-Country Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 1998/169, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Meltzer, Allan-H, 2002. "New International Financial Arrangements," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 20(S1), pages 11-22, December.
    19. Mr. Diego Saravia & Mr. Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Catalyzing Capital Flows: Do IMF-Supported Programs Work As Commitment Devices?," IMF Working Papers 2003/100, International Monetary Fund.
    20. Curzio Giannini & Mr. Carlo Cottarelli, 2002. "Bedfellows, Hostages, or Perfect Strangers? Global Capital Markets and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Crisis Lending," IMF Working Papers 2002/193, International Monetary Fund.
    21. Michael D. Bordo & Harold James, 2000. "The International Monetary Fund: Its Present Role in Historical Perspective," NBER Working Papers 7724, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Kletzer, Kenneth & Mody, Ashoka, 2005. "The IMF in a World of Private Capital Markets," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt84s7r0jf, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry & Kletzer, Kenneth & Mody, Ashoka, 2005. "The IMF in a World of Private Capital Markets," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt84s7r0jf, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    3. Eicher, Theo S. & Kawai, Reina, 2024. "Systemic bias of IMF reserve and debt forecasts for program countries," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 985-1001.
    4. Das, Udaibir S. & Papaioannou, Michael G. & Trebesch, Christoph, . "Sovereign Default Risk and Private Sector Access to Capital in Emerging Markets," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    5. Carlos De Resende, 2007. "IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs: Welfare Implications and the Catalytic Effect," Staff Working Papers 07-22, Bank of Canada.
    6. Patrick A. Imam, 2013. "Impact Of Imf-Supported Programs On Economic Sentiments: A Multinomial Ordered Probit Analysis On Transition Economies," Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy (JICEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(01), pages 1-27.
    7. Eichengreen, Barry & Kletzer, Kenneth & Mody, Ashoka, 2006. "The IMF in a world of private capital markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1335-1357, May.
    8. Mr. Calixte Ahokpossi & Laurence Allain & Giovanna Bua, 2014. "A Constrained Choice? Impact of Concessionality Requirements on Borrowing Behavior," IMF Working Papers 2014/176, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Mr. Bjoern Rother & Ms. Ivetta Hakobyan & Mrs. Monica B de Bolle, 2006. "The Level and Composition of Public Sector Debt in Emerging Market Crises," IMF Working Papers 2006/186, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
    11. Ms. Uma Ramakrishnan & Mr. Juan Zalduendo, 2006. "The Role of IMF Support in Crisis Prevention," IMF Working Papers 2006/075, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Mr. Jun I Kim, 2006. "IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention: An Analytical Framework," IMF Working Papers 2006/156, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Mr. Jun I Kim, 2007. "Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard," IMF Working Papers 2007/104, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Koen J. M. van der Veer & Eelke de Jong, 2013. "IMF-Supported Programmes: Stimulating Capital to Non-defaulting Countries," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 375-395, April.
    15. Mr. Ali J Al-Sadiq, 2015. "The Impact of IMF-Supported Programs on FDI in Low-income Countries," IMF Working Papers 2015/157, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Stephen Matteo Miller, 2012. "Booms and Busts as Exchange Options," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 16(3-4), pages 189-223, September.
    17. Chungshik Moon & Byungwon Woo, 2022. "Curse of friendship: IMF programme, friendship with the United States and foreign direct investment," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(7), pages 2188-2221, July.
    18. Rockoff, Hugh & White, Eugene N., 2012. "Monetary Regimes and Policy on a Global Scale: The Oeuvre of Michael D. Bordo," MPRA Paper 49672, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2013.
    19. Anton Sorin Gabriel, 2016. "Foreign Direct Investment Flows and IMF Lending Programs. New Empirical Evidence from CESEE Countries," Scientific Annals of Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 63(3), pages 311-320, November.
    20. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2009. "Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 126-136, September.
    21. Stephen Nelson, 2010. "Does compliance matter? Assessing the relationship between sovereign risk and compliance with international monetary law," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 107-139, June.
    22. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2007. "The Analysis of Catalysis: IMF Programs and Private Capital Flows," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0107, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael D. Bordo & Mr. Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes, 2004. "Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF," IMF Working Papers 2004/197, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Carlos De Resende, 2007. "IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs: Welfare Implications and the Catalytic Effect," Staff Working Papers 07-22, Bank of Canada.
    3. Butkiewicz, James L. & Yanikkaya, Halit, 2005. "The Effects of IMF and World Bank Lending on Long-Run Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 371-391, March.
    4. Mr. Ali J Al-Sadiq, 2015. "The Impact of IMF-Supported Programs on FDI in Low-income Countries," IMF Working Papers 2015/157, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Dreher, Axel, 2006. "IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 769-788, May.
    6. James L. Butkiewicz & Halit Yanikkaya, 2003. "An Assessment of the Effectiveness of International Financial Intervention," Working Papers 03-05, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
    7. Roberto Benelli, 2003. "Do IMF-Supported Programs Boost Private Capital Inflows? the Role of Program Size and Policy Adjustment," IMF Working Papers 2003/231, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Martin Steinwand & Randall Stone, 2008. "The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 123-149, June.
    9. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2009. "Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 126-136, September.
    10. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2007. "The Analysis of Catalysis: IMF Programs and Private Capital Flows," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0107, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    11. Adrian Penalver, 2004. "How can the IMF catalyse private capital flows? A model," Bank of England working papers 215, Bank of England.
    12. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    13. Hutchison, Michael M. & Noy, Ilan, 2003. "Macroeconomic effects of IMF-sponsored programs in Latin America: output costs, program recidivism and the vicious cycle of failed stabilizations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 991-1014, December.
    14. Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Mr. Jonathan David Ostry & Mr. Olivier D Jeanne, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 2008/236, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Boz, Emine, 2011. "Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 70-82, January.
    16. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
    17. Noy, Ilan, 2008. "Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 64-78, February.
    18. Evrensel, Ayse Y., 2004. "Lending to developing countries revisited: changing nature of lenders and payment problems," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 235-256, September.
    19. François Combarnous & Eric Berr & Eric Rougier, 2005. "Too much consensus could be harmful : measuring the degree of implementation of the Washington consensus and its impact on economic growth," Post-Print hal-00152995, HAL.
    20. della Paolera, Gerardo & Taylor, Alan M., 2013. "Sovereign debt in Latin America, 1820-1913," Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(2), pages 173-217, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10834. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.