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Does compliance matter? Assessing the relationship between sovereign risk and compliance with international monetary law

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  • Stephen Nelson

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  • Stephen Nelson, 2010. "Does compliance matter? Assessing the relationship between sovereign risk and compliance with international monetary law," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 107-139, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:2:p:107-139
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-010-9080-7
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Compliance with international law; Sovereign risk; The International Monetary Fund; JEL Codes; F33; F53; F55; F59; G24;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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