Does compliance matter? Assessing the relationship between sovereign risk and compliance with international monetary law
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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-010-9080-7
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More about this item
Keywords
Compliance with international law; Sovereign risk; The International Monetary Fund; JEL Codes; F33; F53; F55; F59; G24;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
- F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
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