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Asbestos and the Future of Mass Torts

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  • Michelle J. White

Abstract

Asbestos was once referred to as a miracle mineral' for its ability to withstand heat and it was used in thousands of products. But exposure to asbestos causes cancer and other diseases. As of the beginning of 2001, 600,000 individuals had filed lawsuits for asbestos-related diseases against more than 6,000 defendants. 85 firms have filed for bankruptcy due to asbestos liabilities and several insurers have failed or are in financial distress. More than $54 billion has been spent on the litigation higher than any other mass tort. Estimates of the eventual cost of asbestos litigation range from $200 to $265 billion. The paper examines the history of asbestos regulation and asbestos liability and argues that it was liability rather than regulation that eventually caused producers to eliminate asbestos from most products by the late 1970s. But despite the disappearance of asbestos products from the marketplace, asbestos litigation continued to grow. Plaintiffs' lawyers used forum-shopping to select the most favorable state courts techniques for mass processing of claims, and substituted new defendants when old ones went bankrupt. Because representing asbestos victims was extremely profitable, lawyers had an incentive to seek out large numbers of additional plaintiffs, including many claimants who were not harmed by asbestos exposure. The paper contrasts asbestos litigation to other mass torts involving personal injury and concludes that asbestos was unique in a number of ways, so that future mass torts are unlikely to be as big. However new legal innovations developed for asbestos are likely to make future mass torts larger and more expensive. I explore two mechanisms-- bankruptcies and class action settlements--that the legal system has developed to resolve mass torts and show that neither has worked for asbestos litigation. The first, bankruptcy by individual asbestos defendants, exacerbates the litigation by spreading it to non-bankrupt defendants. The second, a class action settlement, is impractical for asbestos litigation because of the large number of defendants. As a result, Congressional legislation is needed and the paper discusses the compensation fund approach that Congress is currently considering.

Suggested Citation

  • Michelle J. White, 2004. "Asbestos and the Future of Mass Torts," NBER Working Papers 10308, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10308
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Accident Law," NBER Working Papers 9694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Michelle J. White, 2002. "Explaining the Flood of Asbestos Litigation: Consolidation, Bifurcation, and Bouquet Trials," NBER Working Papers 9362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. White, Michelle J, 1989. "The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 129-151, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ran An & Ying Zhou & Rongzhao Zhang, 2024. "The development, shortcomings and future improvement of punitive damages for environmental torts in China—a reflection and comparative research," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-12, December.
    2. Ramello, Giovanni B., 2012. "Aggregate litigation and regulatory innovation: Another view of judicial efficiency," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 63-71.
    3. Landeo, Claudia M., 2009. "Cognitive coherence and tort reform," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 898-912, December.
    4. Landeo, Claudia M., 2009. "Tort Reform, Disputes and Belief Formation," MPRA Paper 13453, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Alex Coad & Gianluca Biggi & Elisa Giuliani, 2021. "Asbestos, leaded petrol, and other aberrations: comparing countries’ regulatory responses to disapproved products and technologies," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(2), pages 201-233, February.
    6. Kristian Kallenberg, 2007. "The Role of Risk in Corporate Value: A Case Study of the ABB Asbestos Litigation," Journal of Risk Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(8), pages 1007-1025, December.
    7. Paul Rubin, 2005. "Public choice and tort reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 223-236, July.
    8. Taillard, Jerome Ph. A., 2008. "Thriving in the Midst of Financial Distress? An Analysis of Firms Exposed to Abestos Litigation," Working Paper Series 2008-12, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    9. Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, 2005. "Data Watch: Tort-uring the Data," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 207-220, Spring.
    10. Taillard, Jérôme P., 2013. "The disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities: Evidence from asbestos litigation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 267-293.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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