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Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

Author

Listed:
  • Bossert, W.
  • Brams, S.J.
  • Kilgour, D.M.

Abstract

In this paper we will describe a class of three-person games and draw general conclusions about non-cooperative behavior in them.

Suggested Citation

  • Bossert, W. & Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 2000. "Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?," Cahiers de recherche 2000-15, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:2000-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brams, S. J. & Kilgour, M. D., 2001. "Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper," Working Papers 01-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    2. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
    3. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Mark, 1997. "The Truel," Working Papers 97-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgren, 2004. "Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(4), pages 517-538, October.
    2. David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2013. "The robustness of ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 937-956, April.
    3. Athanasios Kehagias, 2024. "On the Nash equilibria of a simple discounted duel," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 34(2), pages 65-84.
    4. Gonzalez, Luis J. & Castaneda, Marco & Scott, Frank, 2019. "Solving the simultaneous truel in The Weakest Link: Nash or revenge?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 56-72.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    GAME THEORY ; ECONOMIC MODELS;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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