IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cvs/starer/97-05.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Truel

Author

Listed:
  • Brams, Steven J.
  • Kilgour, D. Mark

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Mark, 1997. "The Truel," Working Papers 97-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:97-05
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gallice, Andrea, 2008. "Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game," MPRA Paper 10256, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003. "Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 911-929, November.
    3. Bossert, Walter & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2002. "Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-202, August.
    4. David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2013. "The robustness of ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 937-956, April.
    5. Kress, Moshe & Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Feichtinger, Gustav & Grass, Dieter & Seidl, Andrea, 2018. "Lanchester model for three-way combat," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 264(1), pages 46-54.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Truel; games of timing; backward induction; Prisoners' Dilemma;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:97-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Anne Stubing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aenyuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.