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Policy Stable States in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

Author

Listed:
  • Dao-Zhi Zeng
  • Liping Fang
  • Keith Hipel
  • D. Kilgour

Abstract

A new approach to policy analysis is formulated within the framework of the graph model for conflict resolution. A policy is defined as a plan of action for a decision maker (DM) that specifies the DM’s intended action starting at every possible state in a graph model of a conflict. Given a profile of policies, a Policy Stable State (PSS) is a state that no DM moves away from (according to its policy), and such that no DM would prefer to change its policy given the policies of the other DMs. The profile of policies associated to a PSS is called a Policy Equilibrium. Properties of PSSs are developed, and a refinement is suggested that restricts DMs to policies that are credible in that they are in the DM’s immediate interest. Relationships with existing stability definitions in the graph model for conflict resolution are then explored. Copyright Springer 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Dao-Zhi Zeng & Liping Fang & Keith Hipel & D. Kilgour, 2004. "Policy Stable States in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 345-365, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:57:y:2004:i:4:p:345-365
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-2459-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sabino, Emerson Rodrigues & Rêgo, Leandro Chaves, 2024. "Minimax regret stability in the graph model for conflict resolution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 314(3), pages 1087-1097.
    2. Leandro Chaves Rêgo & Giannini Italino Alves Vieira, 2020. "Alternative Generalized Metarationalities for Multiple Decision-Maker Conflicts," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 461-490, June.

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