The Closed Primaries versus the Top-two Primary
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Amorós, P. & Martínez, Ricardo & Puy, M. Socorro, 2013. "The closed primaries versus the top-two primary," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1319, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
References listed on IDEAS
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Hummel, Patrick, 2013. "Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 85-102.
- Amorós, P. & Martínez, Ricardo & Puy, M. Socorro, 2013.
"The closed primaries versus the top-two primary,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
we1319, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Pablo Amorós & M. Socorro Puy & Ricardo Martínez, 2014. "The Closed Primaries versus the Top-two Primary," Working Papers 2014-02, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- James M. Snyder, Jr & Michael M. Ting, 2011. "Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 782-796, October.
- Laurent Bouton, 2013.
"A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1248-1288, June.
- Laurent Bouton, 2012. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2012-001, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Laurent Bouton, 2013. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/160854, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Hannes Mueller, 2015.
"Primaries: the unifying force,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 289-305, June.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Hannes Mueller, 2010. "Primaries: The Unifying Force," Working Papers 496, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Hannes Mueller, 2010. "Primaries: The Unifying Force," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 843.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Mueller, Hannes, 2015. "Primaries: the unifying force," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 62019, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- César Martinelli, 2002.
"Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 901-919.
- Cesar Martinelli, 2000. "Simple Plurality versus Plurality Runoff with Privately Informed Voters," Working Papers 0004, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Hirano, Shigeo & Snyder, James M. & Ansolabehere, Stephen & Hansen, John Mark, 2010. "Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(2), pages 169-191, August.
- Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Amorós, P. & Martínez, Ricardo & Puy, M. Socorro, 2013.
"The closed primaries versus the top-two primary,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
we1319, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Pablo Amorós & M. Socorro Puy & Ricardo Martínez, 2014. "The Closed Primaries versus the Top-two Primary," Working Papers 2014-02, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Pablo Amorós & M. Socorro Puy & Ricardo Martínez, 2016. "Closed primaries versus top-two primaries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 21-35, April.
- Akifumi Ishihara, 2020. "Strategic candidacy for political compromise in party politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 389-408, July.
- Bernard Grofman & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries," Working Papers 135286117, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2021.
"Information aggregation with runoff voting,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
- Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2019. "Information Aggregation with Runoff Voting," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 09-2019, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura & Terence Yeo, 2019.
"Primaries, Strategic Voters and Heterogenous Valences,"
Discussion Papers Series
605, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Diego Carrasco Novoa & Shino Takayamaz & Yuki Tamura & Terence Yeo, 2020. "Primaries, Strategic Voters and Heterogeneous Valences," Discussion Papers Series 631, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Andreottola, Giovanni, 2021. "Signaling valence in primary elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 1-32.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012.
"One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Working Papers ECARES 2008-017, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/108675, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Castanheira, Micael & Bouton, Laurent, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Hannes Mueller, 2015.
"Primaries: the unifying force,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 289-305, June.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Hannes Mueller, 2010. "Primaries: The Unifying Force," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 843.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Mueller, Hannes, 2015. "Primaries: the unifying force," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 62019, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Hannes Mueller, 2010. "Primaries: The Unifying Force," Working Papers 496, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Verdier, Thierry & Seror, Avner, 2018. "Multi-candidate Political Competition and the Industrial Organization of Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 13121, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2021.
"Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 18-38.
- Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2019. "Stress-Testing the Runoff Rule in the Laboratory," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 10-2019, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Valerio Dotti, 2022. "No Country for Young People? The Rise of Anti-Immigration Politics in Ageing Societies," Working Papers 2022:14, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Agustin Casas, 2020. "Ideological extremism and primaries," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 829-860, April.
- Nicolas Motz, 2019.
"Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(1), pages 161-196, January.
- Motz, Nicolas, 2012. "Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection," MPRA Paper 42678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Motz, Nicolas, 2012. "Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection," MPRA Paper 44462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2013.
- Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016.
"Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
- Castanheira, Micael & Bouton, Laurent & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 9234, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_20, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2015. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 777, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Micael Castanheira De Moura & Laurent Bouton & A. Llorente-Saguer, 2016. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/242105, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Caroline Le Pennec, 2024.
"Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(658), pages 785-810.
- Caroline Le Pennec, 2020. "Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos," SoDa Laboratories Working Paper Series 2020-05, Monash University, SoDa Laboratories.
- Bernhardt, Dan & Stefan Krasa, Stefan & Squintani, Francesco, 2024.
"Political Competition and Strategic Voting in Multi-Candidate Elections,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
1489, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Bernhardt, Dan & Krasa, Stefan & Squintani, Francesco, 2024. "Political Competition and Strategic Voting in Multi-Candidate Elections," QAPEC Discussion Papers 21, Quantitative and Analytical Political Economy Research Centre.
- Laurent Bouton & Jorge Gallego & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Rebecca Morton, 2022.
"Run-off Elections in the Laboratory,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(641), pages 106-146.
- Bouton, Laurent & Gallego, Jorge & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca, 2019. "Runoff Elections in the Laboratory," CEPR Discussion Papers 13824, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurent Bouton & Jorge Gallego & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Rebecca Morton, 2019. "Runoff Elections in the Laboratory," NBER Working Papers 25949, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dotti, Valerio, 2020. "No Country for Young People? The Rise of Anti-immigration Populism in Ageing Societies," MPRA Paper 100226, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Evrenk, Haldun & Lambie-Hanson, Timothy & Xu, Yourong, 2013. "Party-bosses vs. party-primaries: Quality of legislature under different selectorates," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 168-182.
- Massimiliano Ferraresi & Leonzio Rizzo & Alberto Zanardi, 2015.
"Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(6), pages 977-998, December.
- Massimiliano Ferraresi & Leonzio Rizzo & Alberto Zanardi, 2014. "Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections," Working papers 13, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
More about this item
Keywords
Closed primaries; Open primaries; Top-two primary; Citizen-candidate; Strategic Voting; Sequential voting. Condorcet consistency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2014-12-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2014-12-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2014-12-24 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2014-12-24 (Positive Political Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2014-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ascension Andina (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dtmales.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.