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Pablo Amoros

Personal Details

First Name:Pablo
Middle Name:
Last Name:Amoros
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pam9
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://sites.google.com/site/pabloamoros2/
Terminal Degree:1997 Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales; Universidad de Alicante (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Universidad de Málaga

Málaga, Spain
https://theeconomics.uma.es/
RePEc:edi:dtmales (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Pablo Amorós, 2022. "Evaluation and strategic manipulation," Working Papers 2022-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  2. Pablo Amorós, 2018. "Majoritarian aggregation and Nash implementation of experts' opinions," Working Papers 2018-05, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  3. Pablo Amorós, 2018. "Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition," Working Papers 2018-03, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  4. Pablo Amorós, 2017. "The problem of aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition," Working Papers 2017-04, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  5. Pablo Amorós, 2015. "Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms," Working Papers 2015-04, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  6. Pablo Amorós, 2014. "Conditions on the jury for the natural implementation of the deserving winner of a contest," Working Papers 2014-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  7. Amorós, P. & Martínez, Ricardo & Puy, M. Socorro, 2013. "The closed primaries versus the top-two primary," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1319, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  8. Pablo Amorós, 2010. "A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants," Working Papers 2010-07, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  9. Pablo Amorós & Ricardo Martínez & Bernardo Moreno & M. Socorro Puy, 2010. "Deciding Whether a Law is Constitutional, Interpretable, or Unconstitutional," Working Papers 2010-09, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  10. Pablo Amorós, 2009. "Picking the Winners," Working Papers 2009-2, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    • Pablo Amorós, 2010. "Picking the Winners," Working Papers 2010-06, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  11. Pablo Amoros, 2008. "Unequivocal Majority and Maskin-Monotonicity," Working Papers 2008-3, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  12. Pablo Amoros & M. Socorro Puy, 2008. "Indicators of Electoral Victory," Working Papers 2008-8, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  13. AMOROS, Pablo & PUY, M. Socorro, 2007. "Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Pablo Amorós, 2006. "Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/10, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  15. Pablo Amorós & M. Socorro Puy, 2004. "A Model of Political Campaign Manipulation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/20, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  16. Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  17. Pablo Amorós, 1998. "- Single-Peaked Preferences With Several Commodities," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  18. Bernarda Zamora & Pablo Amorós, 1998. "- Implementation Of Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

Articles

  1. Amorós, Pablo, 2023. "Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 1-10.
  2. Amorós, Pablo, 2023. "Evaluation and strategic manipulation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
  3. Amorós, Pablo, 2022. "Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  4. Amorós, Pablo, 2021. "Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  5. Amorós, Pablo, 2020. "Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  6. Pablo Amorós, 2020. "Aggregating experts’ opinions to select the winner of a competition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 833-849, September.
  7. Amorós, Pablo, 2019. "Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: Conditions based on the jury," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 26-38.
  8. Amorós, Pablo, 2016. "Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 44-57.
  9. Pablo Amorós & M. Socorro Puy & Ricardo Martínez, 2016. "Closed primaries versus top-two primaries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 21-35, April.
  10. Pablo Amorós & M. Puy, 2013. "Issue convergence or issue divergence in a political campaign?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 355-371, June.
  11. Pablo Amorós, 2013. "Picking the winners," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 845-865, November.
  12. Pablo Amorós & Ricardo Martínez & Bernardo Moreno & M. Puy, 2012. "Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 1-14, March.
  13. Amorós, Pablo, 2011. "A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 241-244, March.
  14. Pablo Amorós & M. Puy, 2010. "Indicators of electoral victory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 239-251, July.
  15. Pablo Amorós, 2009. "Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(4), pages 521-532, November.
  16. Amorós, Pablo, 2009. "Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1211-1226, May.
  17. Amoros, Pablo & Moreno, Bernardo, 2006. "Bargaining and waning commitments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 417-422, September.
  18. Amoros, Pablo, 2004. "Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-434, November.
  19. Amoros, Pablo & Corchon, Luis C. & Moreno, Bernardo, 2002. "The Scholarship Assignment Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-18, January.
  20. Pablo Amorós, 2002. "Single-peaked preferences with several commodities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 57-67.
  21. Pablo AmorÕs & Bernardo Moreno, 2001. "original papers : Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(1), pages 41-61.
  22. Amoros, Pablo, 1999. "Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 341-349, June.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Amorós, P. & Martínez, Ricardo & Puy, M. Socorro, 2013. "The closed primaries versus the top-two primary," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1319, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. Amorós, P. & Martínez, Ricardo & Puy, M. Socorro, 2013. "The closed primaries versus the top-two primary," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1319, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

  2. Pablo Amorós, 2010. "A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants," Working Papers 2010-07, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.

    Cited by:

    1. Moskalenko, Anna, 2015. "A mechanism to pick the deserving winner," Working Papers 2072/252215, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.

  3. Pablo Amoros & M. Socorro Puy, 2008. "Indicators of Electoral Victory," Working Papers 2008-8, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.

    Cited by:

    1. Josep M. Colomer & Humberto Llavador, 2008. "An agenda-setting model of electoral competition," Economics Working Papers 1070, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2010.
    2. Farvaque, Etienne & Foucault, Martial & Vigeant, Stéphane, 2020. "The politician and the vote factory: Candidates’ resource management skills and electoral returns," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 38-55.
    3. Stephen Ansolabehere & M. Socorro Puy, 2015. "Issue-salience, Issue-divisiveness and Voting Decisions," Working Papers 2015-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    4. Pablo Amorós & M. Puy, 2013. "Issue convergence or issue divergence in a political campaign?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 355-371, June.

  4. AMOROS, Pablo & PUY, M. Socorro, 2007. "Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Cited by:

    1. Demange, Gabrielle & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "A communication game on electoral platforms," IDEI Working Papers 589, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    2. Josep M. Colomer & Humberto Llavador, 2008. "An agenda-setting model of electoral competition," Economics Working Papers 1070, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2010.
    3. Enriqueta Aragonès & Micael Castanheira & Marco Giani, 2012. "Electoral Competition through Issue Selection," Working Papers 641, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Pablo Amoros & M. Socorro Puy, 2008. "Indicators of Electoral Victory," Working Papers 2008-8, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.

  5. Pablo Amorós, 2006. "Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/10, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.

    Cited by:

    1. Pablo Amorós, 2010. "A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants," Working Papers 2010-07, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.

  6. Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.

    Cited by:

    1. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    3. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2008. "Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275717, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2013. "Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 473-501.
    5. Yi, Jianxin, 2011. "Implementation via mechanisms with transfers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 65-70, January.

  7. Pablo Amorós, 1998. "- Single-Peaked Preferences With Several Commodities," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

    Cited by:

    1. Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Package Assignment," Working Papers 2013:43, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    2. Sasaki, Hiroo, 2003. "Limitation of Efficiency: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peaked Preferences with Many Commodities," Working Papers 2003-01, Rice University, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Pablo Amorós & M. Socorro Puy & Ricardo Martínez, 2016. "Closed primaries versus top-two primaries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 21-35, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Bernard Grofman & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries," Working Papers 135286117, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    2. Agustin Casas, 2020. "Ideological extremism and primaries," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 829-860, April.

  2. Pablo Amorós & M. Puy, 2013. "Issue convergence or issue divergence in a political campaign?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 355-371, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Mandel & Xavier Venel, 2017. "Dynamic competition over social networks Dynamic competition over social networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01524453, HAL.
    2. Enriqueta Aragonès & Micael Castanheira & Marco Giani, 2012. "Electoral Competition through Issue Selection," Working Papers 641, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Denter, Philipp, 2020. "Campaign contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    4. Mandel, Antoine & Venel, Xavier, 2020. "Dynamic competition over social networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 280(2), pages 597-608.
    5. Denter, Philipp, 2013. "A theory of communication in political campaigns," Economics Working Paper Series 1302, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    6. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2018. "Conflict and Competition over Multi-Issues," Working Papers 2072/306550, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    7. Zhang, Qiaoxi, 2020. "Vagueness in multidimensional proposals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 307-328.
    8. Antoine Mandel & Xavier Venel, 2017. "Dynamic competition over social networks Dynamic competition over social networks," Post-Print halshs-01524453, HAL.
    9. Yohei Yamaguchi & Ken Yahagi, 2024. "Law enforcement and political misinformation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 3-36, January.
    10. Sturm, Silke, 2019. "Political Competition: How to Measure Party Strategy in Direct Voter Communication using Social Media Data?," Hamburg Discussion Papers in International Economics 1, University of Hamburg, Department of Economics.
    11. Georgy Egorov, 2015. "Single-Issue Campaigns and Multidimensional Politics," NBER Working Papers 21265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Balart, Pau & Casas, Agustin & Troumpounis, Orestis, 2022. "Technological change, campaign spending and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    13. Osório António, 2018. "Conflict and Competition over Multi-Issues," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-17, July.
    14. Stephen Ansolabehere & M. Socorro Puy, 2015. "Issue-salience, Issue-divisiveness and Voting Decisions," Working Papers 2015-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    15. Chitralekha Basu & Matthew Knowles, 2021. "The Revelation Incentive for Issue Engagement in Campaigns," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 132, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    16. Yamaguchi, Yohei, 2022. "Issue selection, media competition, and polarization of salience," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 197-225.

  3. Amorós, Pablo, 2011. "A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 241-244, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Pablo Amorós & M. Puy, 2010. "Indicators of electoral victory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 239-251, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Amorós, Pablo, 2009. "Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1211-1226, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Amoros, Pablo, 2004. "Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-434, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Amoros, Pablo & Corchon, Luis C. & Moreno, Bernardo, 2002. "The Scholarship Assignment Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-18, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Pablo Amorós, 2009. "Picking the Winners," Working Papers 2009-2, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    2. Ascensión Andina Díaz & José A. García-Martínez, 2015. "A theory of media self-silence," Working Papers 2015-05, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    3. M. Puy, 2013. "Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 65-87, January.
    4. Amorós, Pablo, 2009. "Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1211-1226, May.
    5. Yadav, Sonal, 2016. "Selecting winners with partially honest jurors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 35-43.
    6. Amorós, Pablo, 2023. "Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 1-10.
    7. Amorós, Pablo, 2023. "Evaluation and strategic manipulation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    8. Pablo Amorós, 2014. "Conditions on the jury for the natural implementation of the deserving winner of a contest," Working Papers 2014-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    9. Amorós, Pablo, 2016. "Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 44-57.
    10. Doğan, Battal, 2017. "Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 103-110.
    11. Pablo Amorós, 2010. "A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants," Working Papers 2010-07, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    12. Adachi, Tsuyoshi, 2014. "A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 508-518.
    13. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2015. "Symmetry and impartial lotteries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 15-28.
    14. Roger A. McCain, 2003. "Specifying Agents: Probabilistic Equilibrium with Reciprocity," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 9, Society for Computational Economics.
    15. Matthew Olckers & Toby Walsh, 2022. "Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A Survey," Papers 2210.01984, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.

  8. Pablo Amorós, 2002. "Single-peaked preferences with several commodities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 57-67.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Pablo AmorÕs & Bernardo Moreno, 2001. "original papers : Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(1), pages 41-61.

    Cited by:

    1. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    2. Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.

  10. Amoros, Pablo, 1999. "Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 341-349, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 17 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (12) 2008-03-25 2009-06-03 2010-07-24 2010-07-24 2013-10-02 2014-12-24 2014-12-29 2015-05-22 2017-12-11 2018-06-25 2018-07-30 2022-02-28. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (9) 2006-10-07 2008-03-25 2008-04-29 2009-06-03 2010-07-24 2010-11-20 2013-10-02 2014-12-24 2022-02-28. Author is listed
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (7) 2014-12-24 2014-12-29 2015-05-22 2017-12-11 2018-06-25 2018-07-30 2022-02-28. Author is listed
  4. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (5) 2004-03-14 2008-03-25 2008-04-29 2013-10-02 2014-12-24. Author is listed
  5. NEP-DES: Economic Design (4) 2017-12-11 2018-06-25 2018-07-30 2022-02-28
  6. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2003-09-24
  7. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2017-12-11
  8. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2003-09-14

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