IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/luc/wpaper/24-07.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

To Deploy or Not to Deploy CCS Abatement, and When : A Differential Game Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Yiwen Chen

    (Shandong Agricutural University, CN)

  • Nora Paulus

    (University of Luxembourg)

  • Xi Wan

    (Nanjing University, CN)

  • Benteng Zou

    (DEM, Université du Luxembourg)

Abstract

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) can be considered as one of the key tools in the fight against climate change, providing a promising method to reduce human-generated CO2 emissions. Despite its potential, the high cost of CCS deployment leads to an uneven adoption across countries. This paper employs a differential game model with heterogeneous countries facing transboundary pollution to determine the optimal timing to initiate CCS projects, and delivers analytical results for the existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria and the numerical illustration. We show that: (1) The trigger threshold for CCS deployment depends not only on a country’s own costs, but also on the costs of other countries and the costs associated with pollution damage. (2) The optimal timing for different countries to initiate their CCS projects occurs when a country’s pollution level reaches a critical threshold. (3) Countries are more inclined to freeride on the pollution abatement efforts of others when the pollution damage costs are symmetric rather than asymmetric. (4) Finally, we provide sufficient conditions under which some countries refrain from engaging in CCS, despite facing the same pollution damage costs as others.

Suggested Citation

  • Yiwen Chen & Nora Paulus & Xi Wan & Benteng Zou, 2024. "To Deploy or Not to Deploy CCS Abatement, and When : A Differential Game Perspective," DEM Discussion Paper Series 24-07, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:24-07
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10993/62012
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Greenstone & Rema Hanna, 2014. "Environmental Regulations, Air and Water Pollution, and Infant Mortality in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 3038-3072, October.
    2. Larry Karp & Jiangfeng Zhang, 2016. "Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Graciela Chichilnisky & Armon Rezai (ed.), The Economics of the Global Environment, pages 493-533, Springer.
    3. Eva Arceo & Rema Hanna & Paulina Oliva, 2016. "Does the Effect of Pollution on Infant Mortality Differ Between Developing and Developed Countries? Evidence from Mexico City," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(591), pages 257-280, March.
    4. Hoel, Michael & Jensen, Svenn, 2012. "Cutting costs of catching carbon—Intertemporal effects under imperfect climate policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 680-695.
    5. Benchekroun, Hassan & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar, 2016. "The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(1), pages 300-309.
    6. Shackley, Simon & Verma, Preeti, 2008. "Tackling CO2 reduction in India through use of CO2 capture and storage (CCS): Prospects and challenges," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 3554-3561, September.
    7. Boucekkine, Raouf & Ruan, Weihua & Zou, Benteng, 2023. "The irreversible pollution game," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    8. Lafforgue, Gilles & Magné, Bertrand & Moreaux, Michel, 2008. "Energy substitutions, climate change and carbon sinks," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(4), pages 589-597, November.
    9. Javier Frutos & Víctor Gatón & Paula M. López-Pérez & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2022. "Investment in Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Dynamic Game: A Numerical Investigation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 813-843, September.
    10. Zagonari, Fabio, 1998. "International Pollution Problems: Unilateral Initiatives by Environmental Groups in One Country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 46-69, July.
    11. Matthias Kalkuhl & Ottmar Edenhofer & Kai Lessmann, 2015. "The Role of Carbon Capture and Sequestration Policies for Climate Change Mitigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 60(1), pages 55-80, January.
    12. Boucekkine, R. & Pommeret, A. & Prieur, F., 2013. "Optimal regime switching and threshold effects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2979-2997.
    13. Michael Hoel, 1991. "Efficient International Agreements for Reducing Emissions of CO2," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 93-108.
    14. Moreaux, Michel & Withagen, Cees, 2015. "Optimal abatement of carbon emission flows," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 55-70.
    15. Boucekkine, Raouf & Prieur, Fabien & Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis & Zou, Benteng, 2021. "Stochastic petropolitics: The dynamics of institutions in resource-dependent economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    16. Moreaux, Michel & Amigues, Jean-Pierre & van der Meijden, Gerard & Withagen, Cees, 2024. "Carbon capture: Storage vs. Utilization," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    17. Alain Ayong Le Kama & Mouez Fodha & LAFFORGUE Gilles, 2009. "Optimal Carbon Capture and Storage policies," LERNA Working Papers 09.24.300, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    18. Karp, Larry & Zhang, Jiangfeng, 2006. "Regulation with anticipated learning about environmental damages," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 259-279, May.
    19. Janet Currie & Joshua Graff Zivin & Jamie Mullins & Matthew Neidell, 2014. "What Do We Know About Short- and Long-Term Effects of Early-Life Exposure to Pollution?," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 217-247, October.
    20. Michael Hoel, 2011. "The Supply Side of CO 2 with Country Heterogeneity," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(4), pages 846-865, December.
    21. Schumacher, Ingmar & Zou, Benteng, 2008. "Pollution perception: A challenge for intergenerational equity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 296-309, May.
    22. Joshua Graff Zivin & Matthew Neidell, 2013. "Environment, Health, and Human Capital," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(3), pages 689-730, September.
    23. Augeraud-Véron, Emmanuelle & Leandri, Marc, 2014. "Optimal pollution control with distributed delays," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 24-32.
    24. Bertinelli, Luisito & Camacho, Carmen & Zou, Benteng, 2014. "Carbon capture and storage and transboundary pollution: A differential game approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(2), pages 721-728.
    25. Hoel, Michael & Karp, Larry, 2002. "Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 367-384, November.
    26. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "Too much coal, too little oil," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 62-77.
    27. Augeraud-Véron, Emmanuelle & Leandri, Marc, 2014. "Optimal pollution control with distributed delays," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 24-32.
    28. Amigues, Jean-Pierre & Lafforgue, Gilles & Moreaux, Michel, 2016. "Optimal timing of carbon capture policies under learning-by-doing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 20-37.
    29. Berthod, Mathias & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2019. "On agreements in a nonrenewable resource market: A cooperative differential game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 23-39.
    30. Garg, Amit & Shukla, P.R., 2009. "Coal and energy security for India: Role of carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage (CCS)," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 34(8), pages 1032-1041.
    31. Dutta, Prajit K. & Radner, Roy, 2009. "A strategic analysis of global warming: Theory and some numbers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 187-209, August.
    32. Jun Rentschler & Nadezda Leonova, 2023. "Global air pollution exposure and poverty," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 14(1), pages 1-11, December.
    33. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
    34. Torre, Davide La & Liuzzi, Danilo & Marsiglio, Simone, 2021. "Transboundary pollution externalities: Think globally, act locally?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    35. Solomon Hsiang & Paulina Oliva & Reed Walker, 2019. "The Distribution of Environmental Damages," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(1), pages 83-103.
    36. Tomiyama, Ken, 1985. "Two-stage optimal control problems and optimality conditions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 317-337, November.
    37. Smala Fanokoa, Pascaux & Telahigue, Issam & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 935-946, June.
    38. William D. Nordhaus, 2007. "A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 686-702, September.
    39. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
    40. Chen, Yiwen & Paulus, Nora & Wan, Xi & Zou, Benteng, 2024. "Optimal timing of carbon capture and storage policies — A social planner’s view," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    41. Rolf Golombek & Mads Greaker & Snorre Kverndokk & Lin Ma, 2023. "Policies to Promote Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 85(1), pages 267-302, May.
    42. Michael Greenstone & B. Kelsey Jack, 2015. "Envirodevonomics: A Research Agenda for an Emerging Field," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(1), pages 5-42, March.
    43. Makris, Miltiadis, 2001. "Necessary conditions for infinite-horizon discounted two-stage optimal control problems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 1935-1950, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Durmaz, Tunç, 2018. "The economics of CCS: Why have CCS technologies not had an international breakthrough?," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 328-340.
    2. Boucekkine, Raouf & Ruan, Weihua & Zou, Benteng, 2023. "The irreversible pollution game," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    3. Raouf Boucekkine & Carmen Camacho & Weihua Ruan & Benteng Zou, 2022. "Why and when coalitions split? An alternative analytical approach with an application to environmental agreements," Working Papers halshs-03676670, HAL.
    4. Colmer, Jonathan & Lin, Dajun & Liu, Siying & Shimshack, Jay, 2021. "Why are pollution damages lower in developed countries? Insights from high-Income, high-particulate matter Hong Kong," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    5. García, Jorge H. & Torvanger, Asbjørn, 2019. "Carbon leakage from geological storage sites: Implications for carbon trading," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 320-329.
    6. Traeger, Christian, 2021. "ACE - Analytic Climate Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers 15968, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen & Tarui, Nori, 2017. "Cooperation on climate-change mitigation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 43-55.
    8. Christian Traeger, 2014. "Why uncertainty matters: discounting under intertemporal risk aversion and ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 627-664, August.
    9. Fukushima, Nanna, 2021. "The UK Clean Air Act, Black Smoke, and Infant Mortality," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 587, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    10. Hao Xu & Deqing Tan, 2023. "Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 905-935, March.
    11. Bonneuil, N. & Boucekkine, R., 2016. "Optimal transition to renewable energy with threshold of irreversible pollution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(1), pages 257-262.
    12. Tunç Durmaz & Fred Schroyen, 2020. "Evaluating Carbon Capture And Storage In A Climate Model With Endogenous Technical Change," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(01), pages 1-47, February.
    13. Raouf Boucekkine & Carmen Camacho & Weihua Ruan & Benteng Zou, 2022. "Optimal coalition splitting with heterogenous strategies," Working Papers halshs-03770401, HAL.
    14. Hao Xu & Ming Luo, 2022. "Optimal Environmental Policy in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Emission Standards, Taxes, and Permit Trading," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-25, July.
    15. Syed Hasan & Odmaa Narantungalag, & Martin Berka, 2022. "No pain, no gain? Mining pollution and morbidity," Discussion Papers 2203, School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, New Zealand.
    16. Boucekkine, Raouf & Fabbri, Giorgio & Federico, Salvatore & Gozzi, Fausto, 2021. "From firm to global-level pollution control: The case of transboundary pollution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(1), pages 331-345.
    17. Syed Hasan & Odmaa Narantungalag, & Martin Berka, 2022. "The intended and unintended consequences of large electricity subsidies: evidence from Mongolia," Discussion Papers 2202, School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, New Zealand.
    18. Newbery, David, 2018. "Policies for decarbonizing a liberalized power sector," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 12, pages 1-24.
    19. David M. Newbery & David M. Reiner & Robert A. Ritz, 2018. "When is a carbon price floor desirable?," Working Papers EPRG 1816, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    20. Marc GRONWALD & Ngo Van LONG & Luise ROEPKE, 2017. "Three Degrees of Green Paradox: The Weak, The Strong, and the Extreme Green Paradox," Cahiers de recherche 02-2017, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Carbon capture and storage; optimal timing; Markovian perfect equilibrium.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:24-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marina Legrand (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/crcrplu.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.