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How do coalitions break down? An alternative view

Author

Listed:
  • Raouf Boucekkine

    (ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business, CUT - Centre for Unframed Thinking - ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business)

  • Carmen Camacho

    (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Weihua Ruan

    (Purdue University Northwest, CUT - Centre for Unframed Thinking - ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business)

  • Benteng Zou

    (uni.lu - Université du Luxembourg = University of Luxembourg = Universität Luxemburg)

Abstract

We propose an alternative dynamic theory of coalition breakdown. Motivated by recent coalition splitting events through unilateral countries' withdrawals, we assume that: i) the payoff sharing rule within coalitions is not necessarily set according to any optimality and/or stability criterion, and, ii) players initially behave as if the coalition will last forever. If the sharing rule is non-negotiable or if renegotiation is very costly, compliance to these rules may become unbearable for a given member

Suggested Citation

  • Raouf Boucekkine & Carmen Camacho & Weihua Ruan & Benteng Zou, 2023. "How do coalitions break down? An alternative view," PSE Working Papers hal-04287200, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-04287200
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04287200v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hassan Benchekroun & Gerhard Sorger, 2024. "Preface: Special issue of Dynamic Games and Applications in Memory of Professor Ngo Van Long," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-6, March.

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    Keywords

    Coalition splitting; Environmental agreements; Constitutional vs technological heterogeneity; Differential games; Multistage optimal control;
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