IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-03056026.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Stochastic petropolitics: The dynamics of institutions in resource-dependent economies

Author

Listed:
  • Raouf Boucekkine

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Fabien Prieur

    (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement)

  • Chrysovalantis Vasilakis

    (UCL IRES - Institut de recherches économiques et sociales - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics)

  • Benteng Zou

    (uni.lu - Université du Luxembourg = University of Luxembourg = Universität Luxemburg)

Abstract

We investigate the link between resource revenues volatility and institutions. We build a stochastic differential game with two players (conservatives vs. liberals) lobbying for changing the institutions in their preferred directions. First, uncertainty surrounds the dynamics of institutions and the resource revenues. Second, the lobbying power is asymmetric, the conservatives' power being increasing with resource revenues. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium in the set of affine strategies. We then examine to which extent uncertainty leads to more liberal institutions in the long run, compared to the deterministic case. We finally explore the institutional impact of volatility using a database covering 91 countries over the period 1973–2005. Focusing on financial liberalization, we find that as oil revenue volatility increases, liberalization goes down. This result is robust to different specifications and sample distinctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Chrysovalantis Vasilakis & Benteng Zou, 2020. "Stochastic petropolitics: The dynamics of institutions in resource-dependent economies," Post-Print hal-03056026, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03056026
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103610
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frederick van der Ploeg & Anthony J. Venables, 2011. "Harnessing Windfall Revenues: Optimal Policies for Resource‐Rich Developing Economies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(551), pages 1-30, March.
    2. Neil A. Wilmot and Charles F. Mason, 2013. "Jump Processes in the Market for Crude Oil," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    3. Nir Jaimovich & Henry E. Siu, 2009. "The Young, the Old, and the Restless: Demographics and Business Cycle Volatility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 804-826, June.
    4. Nicolas Treich, 2010. "Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 339-349, December.
    5. Soren T. Anderson & Ryan Kellogg & Stephen W. Salant, 2018. "Hotelling under Pressure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(3), pages 984-1026.
    6. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Poelhekke, Steven, 2010. "The pungent smell of "red herrings": Subsoil assets, rents, volatility and the resource curse," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 44-55, July.
    7. Rabah Arezki & Markus Brückner, 2012. "Commodity Windfalls, Democracy and External Debt," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(561), pages 848-866, June.
    8. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2008. "Income and Democracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 808-842, June.
    9. Francesco Caselli & Andrea Tesei, 2016. "Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 573-590, July.
    10. Rabah Arezki & Raouf Boucekkine & Jeffrey Frankel & Mohammed Laksaci & Rick van Der Ploeg, 2018. "Rethinking the macroeconomics of resource-rich countries," Post-Print hal-01825465, HAL.
    11. Kevin K. Tsui, 2011. "More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(551), pages 89-115, March.
    12. Gylfason, Thorvaldur, 2001. "Natural resources, education, and economic development," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 847-859, May.
    13. Raouf BOUCEKKINE & Rafik BOUKLIA-HASSANE, 2011. "Rente, corruption et violence : l’émergence d’un ordre nouveau dans les pays arabes ?," Regards économiques 92, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    14. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2011. "From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1676-1706, August.
    15. Abdul Abiad & Enrica Detragiache & Thierry Tressel, 2010. "A New Database of Financial Reforms," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 57(2), pages 281-302, June.
    16. Boucekkine, Raouf & Pintus, Patrick A. & Zou, Benteng, 2018. "Mean growth and stochastic stability in endogenous growth models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 18-24.
    17. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying," AMSE Working Papers 1531, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jan 2018.
    18. Abdul Abiad & Ashoka Mody, 2005. "Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 66-88, March.
    19. Wirl, Franz, 1994. "The Dynamics of Lobbying--A Differential Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(3-4), pages 307-323, September.
    20. Frederick van der Ploeg & Steven Poelhekke, 2009. "Volatility and the natural resource curse," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 727-760, October.
    21. Haber, Stephen & Menaldo, Victor, 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-26, February.
    22. Rick Van der Ploeg & Steven Poelhekke, 2010. "The Pungent Smell of “Red Herrings’: Subsoil assets, rents, volatility and the resource curse," OxCarre Working Papers 033, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    23. Alfonso Miranda & Sophia Rabe-Hesketh, 2006. "Maximum likelihood estimation of endogenous switching and sample selection models for binary, ordinal, and count variables," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 6(3), pages 285-308, September.
    24. Anca M. Cotet & Kevin K. Tsui, 2013. "Oil and Conflict: What Does the Cross Country Evidence Really Show?," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 49-80, January.
    25. Robert C. Merton, 1975. "An Asymptotic Theory of Growth Under Uncertainty," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(3), pages 375-393.
    26. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    27. Arezki, Rabah & van der Ploeg, Frederick & Toscani, Frederik, 2019. "The shifting natural wealth of nations: The role of market orientation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 228-245.
    28. James D. Hamilton, 2018. "Why You Should Never Use the Hodrick-Prescott Filter," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 100(5), pages 831-843, December.
    29. Michael Alexeev & Robert Conrad, 2009. "The Elusive Curse of Oil," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(3), pages 586-598, August.
    30. Boucekkine, Raouf & Prieur, Fabien & Puzon, Klarizze, 2016. "On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 188-207.
    31. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, September.
    32. Boucekkine, Raouf & Prieur, Fabien & Puzon, Klarizze, 2016. "On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 188-207.
    33. Anca M. Cotet & Kevin K. Tsui, 2013. "Oil, Growth, and Health: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(4), pages 1107-1137, October.
    34. Abdul Abiad & Ashoka Mody, 2005. "Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 66-88, March.
    35. Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Warner, Andrew M., 2001. "The curse of natural resources," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 827-838, May.
    36. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thornton, John & Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis, 2023. "Bank regulations and surges and stops in credit: Panel evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    2. R. Boucekkine & F. Prieur & W. Ruan & B. Zou, 2024. "Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(4), pages 1127-1171, June.
    3. Yiwen Chen & Nora Paulus & Xi Wan & Benteng Zou, 2024. "To Deploy or Not to Deploy CCS Abatement, and When : A Differential Game Perspective," DEM Discussion Paper Series 24-07, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    4. Raouf Boucekkine & Rodolphe Desbordes & Paolo Melindi-Ghidi, 2023. "Elite-led revolutions," Working Papers hal-04225397, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying," AMSE Working Papers 1531, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jan 2018.
    2. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Institutional dynamics under revenue volatility and revenue-dependent lobbying power: A stochastic differential game approach," DEM Discussion Paper Series 15-08, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    3. Smith, Brock, 2015. "The resource curse exorcised: Evidence from a panel of countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 57-73.
    4. Edwards, Ryan B., 2016. "Mining away the Preston curve," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 22-36.
    5. Antonakakis, Nikolaos & Cunado, Juncal & Filis, George & Perez de Gracia, Fernando, 2015. "The Resource Curse Hypothesis Revisited: Evidence from a Panel VAR," MPRA Paper 72085, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Matata Ponyo Mapon & Jean-Paul K. Tsasa, 2019. "The artefact of the Natural Resources Curse," Papers 1911.09681, arXiv.org.
    7. Ajide, Kazeem Bello & Ibrahim, Ridwan Lanre & Mohammed, Abubakar & Saleh Al-Faryan, Mamdouh Abdulaziz, 2023. "Infectious diseases and health outcomes’ implications of natural resource curse in Africa," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    8. Antonakakis, Nikolaos & Cunado, Juncal & Filis, George & Gracia, Fernando Perez de, 2017. "Oil dependence, quality of political institutions and economic growth: A panel VAR approach," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 147-163.
    9. Dauvin, Magali & Guerreiro, David, 2017. "The Paradox of Plenty: A Meta-Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 212-231.
    10. Badeeb, Ramez Abubakr & Lean, Hooi Hooi & Clark, Jeremy, 2017. "The evolution of the natural resource curse thesis: A critical literature survey," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 123-134.
    11. Francesco Caselli & Andrea Tesei, 2016. "Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 573-590, July.
    12. Havranek, Tomas & Horvath, Roman & Zeynalov, Ayaz, 2016. "Natural Resources and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 134-151.
    13. R. Boucekkine & F. Prieur & W. Ruan & B. Zou, 2024. "Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(4), pages 1127-1171, June.
    14. Mignamissi, Dieudonné & Malah Kuete, Yselle Flora, 2021. "Resource rents and happiness on a global perspective: The resource curse revisited," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    15. Kaznacheev, Peter, 2013. "Resource Rents and Economic Growth: Economic and institutional development in countries with a high share of income from the sale of natural resources. Analysis and recommendations based on internatio," EconStor Research Reports 121950, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    16. Boucekkine, Raouf & Piacquadio, Paolo G. & Prieur, Fabien, 2019. "A Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 269-291.
    17. Beck, Thorsten & Poelhekke, Steven, 2023. "Follow the money: Does the financial sector intermediate natural resource windfalls?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    18. Boschini, Anne & Pettersson, Jan & Roine, Jesper, 2013. "The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 19-41.
    19. Pelzl, Paul & Poelhekke, Steven, 2021. "Good mine, bad mine: Natural resource heterogeneity and Dutch disease in Indonesia," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    20. Mamo, Nemera & Bhattacharyya, Sambit & Moradi, Alexander, 2019. "Intensive and extensive margins of mining and development: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 28-49.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutional dynamics; Petropolitics; Lobbying games; Stochastic dynamic games; Financial liberalization policies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03056026. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.