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What Allotment and Subcontracting in Procurement Bidding

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  • François MARÉCHAL
  • Pierre-Henri MORAND

Abstract

Allotment and subcontracting are the two alternative mechanisms enabling the participation of SMEs in procurement. We compare these two alternatives in the context of a procurement contract awarded by a first-price sealed-bid auction. When the winning large firm is constrained with respect to the degree of subcontracting, we show that only a reduction of the chosen SME's profit can reduce the expected cost of the contract. However, when the large firm is allowed to choose the subcontracting level, subcontracting can be a Pareto dominating mechanism, i.e. simultaneously increasing both firms' profits and reducing the expected total cost of the contract.

Suggested Citation

  • François MARÉCHAL & Pierre-Henri MORAND, 2004. "What Allotment and Subcontracting in Procurement Bidding," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 04.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
  • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:04.06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Morton I. Kamien & Lode Li & Dov Samet, 1989. "Bertrand Competition with Subcontracting," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 553-567, Winter.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
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    5. Yun, Mikyung, 1999. "Subcontracting relations in the Korean automotive industry: risk sharing and technological capability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 81-108, January.
    6. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
    7. Marechal, Francois & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2003. "Pre vs. post-award subcontracting plans in procurement bidding," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 23-30, October.
    8. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    9. Kawasaki, Seiichi & McMillan, John, 1987. "The design of contracts: Evidence from Japanese subcontracting," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 327-349, September.
    10. Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003. "SMEs and public procurement policy," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(3), pages 301-318, October.
    11. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    allotment; subcontracting; procurement; bidding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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