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Incentives, Procurement and Regulation of Work IntegrationSocial Enterprises in France: Old Ideas for New Firms?

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  • Patrick Gianfaldoni

    (LBNC - Laboratoire Biens, Normes, Contrats - AU - Avignon Université)

  • Pierre-Henri Morand

    (LBNC - Laboratoire Biens, Normes, Contrats - AU - Avignon Université)

Abstract

Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs) in France become increasingly dependent on commercial resources through public and private markets. Following New Public Management reforms that try to modernize the sector via market oriented management, they have restructured and modified their practices. We compare the normative prescriptions of the theory of incentives in regulation to the actual practices. The trend toward competitive process is described and the form of incentives contract toward workfare is detailed. Are the main insights of this literature appealing for this kind of enterprises? Do the traditional incentives and contract theories ignore some very specific features of WISEs entities? We point out the drawbacks of potentially inaccurate forms of regulation contracts currently used.
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  • Patrick Gianfaldoni & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2015. "Incentives, Procurement and Regulation of Work IntegrationSocial Enterprises in France: Old Ideas for New Firms?," Post-Print hal-01313408, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01313408
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jérémy Tantely Ranjatoelina, 2016. "What is an inclusive business model? An 'extended resource-based theory' definition grounded on an investigation of three diversified inclusive enterprises in France [Qu'est-ce qu'un business model," Post-Print hal-01987165, HAL.
    2. Jérémy Tantely Ranjatoelina, 2017. "The inclusive business model revisited. An 'extended resource-based theory' definition built on the investigation of three diversified inclusive enterprises in France," Post-Print hal-01987169, HAL.
    3. Maréchal, François & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2022. "Are social and environmental clauses a tool for favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Andrea Signoretti & Silvia Sacchetti, 2020. "Lean HRM practices in work integration social enterprises: Moving towards social lean production. Evidence from Italian case studies," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 91(4), pages 545-563, December.
    5. Patrick Gianfaldoni, 2018. "Constrained changes of Work Integration Social Enterprises [Les évolutions contraintes des entreprises sociales d’insertion par le travail]," Post-Print hal-02011115, HAL.
    6. Jérémy Tantely Ranjatoelina, 2017. "What is an Inclusive Business Model ? An 'extended resource-based theory' definition built on the investigation of three inclusive enterprises in France," Post-Print hal-01987171, HAL.
    7. Pierre-Henri Morand & François Maréchal, 2021. "Are social and environmental clauses a tool for favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts ," Post-Print hal-03418572, HAL.
    8. Jérémy Ranjatoelina Tantely & Adam Dewitte & Bilal Bourkha, 2016. "Le business model des entreprises sociales inclusives : le cas des SIAE, des EA et des ESAT en France," Post-Print hal-01896939, HAL.
    9. Jérémy Tantely Ranjatoelina & Adam Dewitte & Bilal Bourkha, 2016. "Le business model des entreprises sociales inclusives : le cas des SIAE, des EA et des ESAT," Post-Print hal-01987158, HAL.

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