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Mate Choice Mechanism for Solving a Quasi-Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo

    (Research Center for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology)

  • Junyi Shen

    (Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University)

Abstract

Saijo, Okano, and Yamakawa (2015) showed that the mate choice mechanism for a symmetric prisoner's dilemma (PD) game implements cooperation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), and it attained almost full cooperation in their experiment. This study theoretically shows, first, that this mechanism works well in the class of quasi-dilemma (QD) games, such as asymmetric PD games and coordination games. Second, the class of BEWDS-implementable games is exactly the same as the class of QD games. Third, the mechanism cannot implement cooperation in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Finally, we confirm that the mate choice mechanism works well experimentally for an asymmetric PD game.

Suggested Citation

  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Junyi Shen, 2017. "Mate Choice Mechanism for Solving a Quasi-Dilemma," Working Papers SDES-2017-22, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2017-22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Masuda, Takehito & Okano, Yoshitaka & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2014. "The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 73-85.
    4. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, "undated". "Approval Mechanism to Solve Prisoner’s Dilemma: Comparison with Varian’s Compensation Mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2016-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management.
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    13. Xiaochuan Huang & Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2014. "Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions," Working Papers SDES-2014-7, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2018. "Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 65-77, June.
    2. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, "undated". "Approval Mechanism to Solve Prisoner’s Dilemma: Comparison with Varian’s Compensation Mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2016-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2019. "Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design," Working Papers SDES-2019-6, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jun 2019.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric prisoner's dilemma; Quasi-dilemma; Mate choice mechanism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P43 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Finance; Public Finance

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