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Itemised deductions: a device to reduce tax evasion

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  • Amedeo Piolatto

    (Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

Direct incentives and punishments are the most common instruments to fight tax evasion. The theoretical literature disregarded indirect schemes, such as itemised deductions, in which an agent has an interest in that other agents declare their revenue. Itemised deductions provide an incentive for consumers to declare their purchases, and this forces sellers to do the same. I show that, for any level of taxation, it is possible to increase tax proceeds by choosing the proper level of itemised deduction: the cost for the government on the consumers' side is more than compensated by the extra proceeds on the sellers' side.

Suggested Citation

  • Amedeo Piolatto, 2010. "Itemised deductions: a device to reduce tax evasion," Working Papers. Serie AD 2010-33, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2010-33
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Esteban Muñoz-Sobrado & Amedeo Piolatto & Antoine Zerbini & Federica Braccioli, 2024. "The Taxing Challenges of the State: Unveiling the Role of Fiscal & Administrative Capacity in Development," Working Papers 1432, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Francesco Flaviano Russo, 2022. "Cash thresholds, cash expenditure and tax evasion," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(4), pages 387-403, December.
    4. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2022. "Indirect Taxation, Tax Evasion and Profts," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 242(3), pages 91-109, September.
    5. Immordino, Giovanni & Russo, Francesco Flaviano, 2018. "Cashless payments and tax evasion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 36-43.
    6. Daniel Montolio (University of Barcelona (UB) and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)) & Amedeo Piolatto (University of Barcelona (UB) and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)), 2011. "Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns," Working Papers in Economics 268, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax evasion; itemised deductions; substitutes goods; quantity competition.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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