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Tax Compliance and Firms’ StrategicInterdependence

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  • Ralph Bayer
  • Frank A Cowell

Abstract

We focus on a relatively neglected area of the tax-compliance literature ineconomics, the behaviour of firms. We examine the impact of alternativeaudit rules on receipts from a tax on profits in the context of strategicinter-dependence of firms. In the market firms may compete in terms ofeither output or price. The enforcement policy can have an effect onfirms' behaviour in two dimensions - their market decisions as well astheir compliance behaviour. An appropriate design of the enforcementpolicy can thus have a "double dividend" by manipulating firms in bothdimensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph Bayer & Frank A Cowell, 2006. "Tax Compliance and Firms’ StrategicInterdependence," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 81, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    • Handle: RePEc:cep:stidar:81
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax compliance; evasion; oligopoly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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