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Efficient black markets?

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  • Davidson, Carl
  • Martin, Lawrence
  • Wilson, John Douglas

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  • Davidson, Carl & Martin, Lawrence & Wilson, John Douglas, 2007. "Efficient black markets?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1575-1590, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:91:y:2007:i:7-8:p:1575-1590
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    1. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    2. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre, 1994. "Towards a theory of the direct-indirect tax mix," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 71-88, September.
    3. Martin Feldstein, 1999. "Tax Avoidance And The Deadweight Loss Of The Income Tax," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(4), pages 674-680, November.
    4. Davidson, Carl & Martin, Lawrence W. & Wilson, John D., 2005. "Tax evasion as an optimal tax device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 285-289, February.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Utilitarianism and horizontal equity : The case for random taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-33, June.
    7. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1993. "Tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 261-275, February.
    8. Kopczuk, Wojciech, 2001. "Redistribution when avoidance behavior is heterogeneous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 51-71, July.
    9. Friedrich Schneider & Dominik Enste, 1999. "Shadow Economies Around the World - Size, Causes, and Consequences," CESifo Working Paper Series 196, CESifo.
    10. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    11. Usher, Dan, 1986. "Tax Evasion and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(4), pages 563-586, October.
    12. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1979. "A Note on Optimal Taxation and Administrative Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(3), pages 475-480, June.
    13. Kesselman, Jonathan R., 1989. "Income tax evasion : An intersectoral analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 137-182, March.
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    15. Wilson, John Douglas, 1989. "On the Optimal Tax Base for Commodity Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1196-1206, December.
    16. Brito, Dagobert L. & Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M. & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1995. "Randomization in optimal income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 189-223, February.
    17. Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1987. "On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 15(2), pages 123-137, April.
    18. Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "Optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 221-236, November.
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    20. Filip Palda, 1998. "Evasive Ability and the Efficiency Cost of the Underground Economy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1118-1138, November.
    21. Alm, James, 1985. "The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(2), pages 243-263, April.
    22. Mr. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1995. "The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Cost of Funds," IMF Working Papers 1995/083, International Monetary Fund.
    23. Chang, F. R. & Wildasin, D. E., 1986. "Randomization of commodity taxes : An expenditure minimization approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 329-345, December.
    24. Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November.
    25. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
    26. Andreoni, James, 1992. "IRS as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 35-46, October.
    27. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Piolatto Amedeo, 2015. "Itemised Deductions: A Device to Reduce Tax Evasion," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 422-438, December.
    2. Rosella Levaggi & Francesco Menoncin, 2008. "Merit goods provision and optimal tax evasion," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(7), pages 1-3.
    3. repec:tiu:tiucen:201060 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Dzhumashev, Ratbek & Levaggi, Rosella & Menoncin, Francesco, 2023. "Optimal tax enforcement with productive public inputs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    5. repec:dgr:kubcen:201060 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Amedeo Piolatto, 2015. "Itemised Deductions: A Device to Reduce Tax Evasion," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 16(4), pages 422-438, November.
    7. Amedeo Piolatto, 2015. "Itemised Deductions: A Device to Reduce Tax Evasion," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 16(4), pages 422-438, November.
    8. Davidson, Carl & Martin, Lawrence W. & Wilson, John D., 2005. "Tax evasion as an optimal tax device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 285-289, February.
    9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2008:i:7:p:1-3 is not listed on IDEAS

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