Production versus revenue efficiency with limited tax capacity: theory and evidence from Pakistan
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- Michael Carlos Best & Anne Brockmeyer & Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Johannes Spinnewijn & Mazhar Waseem, 2015. "Production versus Revenue Efficiency with Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(6), pages 1311-1355.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics
- M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ACC-2017-01-08 (Accounting and Auditing)
- NEP-IUE-2017-01-08 (Informal and Underground Economics)
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