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Endogenous Policy Theory: The Political Structure and Policy Formation

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  • Zusman, P.
  • Rausser, Gordon C.

Abstract

Models of economic systems involving government intervention by definition include some policy variables, or policy instruments, through which the policy in implemented. In general, economists have tended to view these variables as exogenously given. While convenient in dealing with some analytical problems, this attitude is not always adequate, as it abstracts from the realities of political-economic life. Evidently, economic policy is not independent of the economic structure, and policy variables are codetermined with endogenous economic variables within an integrated political-economic structure.
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  • Zusman, P. & Rausser, Gordon C., 1990. "Endogenous Policy Theory: The Political Structure and Policy Formation," Staff General Research Papers Archive 812, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:812
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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Zusman, Pinhas, 1976. "The Incorporation and Measurement of Social Power in Economic Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 17(2), pages 447-462, June.
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