IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/marpol/v60y2015icp40-48.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bargaining a net gain compensation agreement between a marine renewable energy developer and a marine protected area manager

Author

Listed:
  • Kyriazi, Zacharoula
  • Lejano, Raul
  • Maes, Frank
  • Degraer, Steven

Abstract

When the development of marine renewable energy (MRE) is only possible inside already established marine protected areas (MPAs), and there is a risk of ecosystem loss, environmental or monetary compensation -being the last step in a hierarchy of mitigation measures- might be an option for working out a trade-off between energy production and nature protection. In this article, it is argued that for this type of siting situation, instead of the well-established strategy of no net loss, a net gain should be provided from the MRE developer to the MPA manager, which acts as an incentive for the manager to cooperate and covers future potentially lost conservation benefits due to MRE potential damages. Based on this argument, a hypothetical example is used to demonstrate that a net gain is ensured only when there is a societal surplus from a combined MRE-MPA arrangement that can be divided between the players through bargaining. However, when asymmetric information is involved, it is shown that cooperative solution concepts are more sufficient for leaving both players better off after coexistence than before.

Suggested Citation

  • Kyriazi, Zacharoula & Lejano, Raul & Maes, Frank & Degraer, Steven, 2015. "Bargaining a net gain compensation agreement between a marine renewable energy developer and a marine protected area manager," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 40-48.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:60:y:2015:i:c:p:40-48
    DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2015.06.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X15001645
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.06.005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Cowell, 2000. "Environmental Compensation and the Mediation of Environmental Change: Making Capital out of Cardiff Bay," Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(5), pages 689-710.
    2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    3. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, October.
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    5. Gastineau, Pascal & Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle, 2014. "Compensating for environmental damages," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 150-161.
    6. Börger, Tobias & Hattam, Caroline & Burdon, Daryl & Atkins, Jonathan P. & Austen, Melanie C., 2014. "Valuing conservation benefits of an offshore marine protected area," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 229-241.
    7. Dunford, Richard W. & Ginn, Thomas C. & Desvousges, William H., 2004. "The use of habitat equivalency analysis in natural resource damage assessments," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 49-70, January.
    8. Myerson, Roger B, 1984. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 461-487, March.
    9. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 249-262.
    10. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    11. Carol A. Jones & Katherine A. Pease, 1997. "Restoration‐Based Compensation Measures In Natural Resource Liability Statutes," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(4), pages 111-122, October.
    12. Samuelson, William F, 1984. "Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 995-1005, July.
    13. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    14. John Gowdy & Jon D. Erickson, 2005. "The approach of ecological economics," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 29(2), pages 207-222, March.
    15. Pascal Gastineau, 2014. "Compensating for environmental damages," Post-Print hal-00968954, HAL.
    16. Nicholas E. Flores & Jennifer Thacher, 2002. "Money, Who Needs It? Natural Resource Damage Assessment," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(2), pages 171-178, April.
    17. Ali Mostashari, 2011. "Collaborative Modeling and Decision-Making for Complex Energy Systems," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 8025, August.
    18. Vaissière, Anne-Charlotte & Levrel, Harold & Pioch, Sylvain & Carlier, Antoine, 2014. "Biodiversity offsets for offshore wind farm projects: The current situation in Europe," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 172-183.
    19. Unsworth, Robert E. & Bishop, Richard C., 1994. "Assessing natural resource damages using environmental annuities," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 35-41, September.
    20. Scott G. Cole, 2013. "Equity over efficiency: a problem of credibility in scaling resource-based compensation?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 93-117, March.
    21. Zafonte, Matthew & Hampton, Steve, 2007. "Exploring welfare implications of resource equivalency analysis in natural resource damage assessments," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 134-145, February.
    22. van Teeffelen Lex & Uhlaner Lorraine M., 2013. "Firm Resource Characteristics and Human Capital as Predictors of Exit Choice: An Exploratory Study of SMEs," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 84-108, January.
    23. Roach, Brian & Wade, William W., 2006. "Policy evaluation of natural resource injuries using habitat equivalency analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 421-433, June.
    24. Lejano, Raul P. & Davos, Climis A., 2001. "Siting noxious facilities with victim compensation: : n-person games under transferable utility," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 109-124.
    25. Levrel, Harold & Pioch, Sylvain & Spieler, Richard, 2012. "Compensatory mitigation in marine ecosystems: Which indicators for assessing the “no net loss” goal of ecosystem services and ecological functions?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1202-1210.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Song, Jinbo & Jin, Lulu & Zhao, Yunpeng & Hu, Wenjin, 2017. "Using bargaining-game model to negotiate compensation for the early termination of BOT highway projects," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 197-209.
    2. Kyriazi, Zacharoula & Maes, Frank & Degraer, Steven, 2016. "Coexistence dilemmas in European marine spatial planning practices. The case of marine renewables and marine protected areas," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 391-399.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Desvousges, William H. & Gard, Nicholas & Michael, Holly J. & Chance, Anne D., 2018. "Habitat and Resource Equivalency Analysis: A Critical Assessment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 74-89.
    2. Cole, Scott, 2012. "Equity over Efficiency: A Problem of Credibility in Scaling Resource-Based Compensatory?," CERE Working Papers 2012:12, CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics.
    3. Defrancesco, Edi & Gatto, Paola & Rosato, Paolo, 2014. "A ‘component-based’ approach to discounting for natural resource damage assessment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 1-9.
    4. Edward B. Barbier, 2013. "Valuing Ecosystem Services for Coastal Wetland Protection and Restoration: Progress and Challenges," Resources, MDPI, vol. 2(3), pages 1-18, August.
    5. Jones, Carol Adaire & DiPinto, Lisa, 2018. "The role of ecosystem services in USA natural resource liability litigation," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 29(PB), pages 333-351.
    6. Roach, Brian & Wade, William W., 2006. "Policy evaluation of natural resource injuries using habitat equivalency analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 421-433, June.
    7. Gastineau, Pascal & Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle, 2014. "Compensating for environmental damages," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 150-161.
    8. Johansson, Per-Olov & Kriström, Bengt, 2012. "On a New Approach to Social Evaluations of Environmental Projects," CERE Working Papers 2012:4, CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics.
    9. Gastineau, Pascal & Mossay, Pascal & Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle, 2021. "Ecological compensation: How much and where?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    10. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1991. "Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme: Analytische Konzepte und institutionelle Lösungen am Beispiel der Zusammenarbeit zwischen zwei Bundesländern," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    11. Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick, 2012. "Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 495-514.
    12. Duffield, John & Neher, Chris & Patterson, David, 2021. "Estimating compensation ratios for tribal resources within a habitat equivalency framework," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    13. Pavanelli, David Domingues & Voulvoulis, Nikolaos, 2019. "Habitat Equivalency Analysis, a framework for forensic cost evaluation of environmental damage," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 1-1.
    14. Zafonte, Matthew & Hampton, Steve, 2007. "Exploring welfare implications of resource equivalency analysis in natural resource damage assessments," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 134-145, February.
    15. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    16. Ursula F Ott & Pervez N Ghauri, 2019. "Brexit negotiations: From negotiation space to agreement zones," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(1), pages 137-149, February.
    17. Joalland, Olivier & Pereau, Jean-Christophe & Rambonilaza, Tina, 2019. "Bargaining local compensation payments for the installation of new power transmission lines," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 75-85.
    18. Pascal Gastineau & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2012. "Which compensation for whom?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12080, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    19. Takeuchi, Ai & Veszteg, Róbert F. & Kamijo, Yoshio & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2022. "Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 169-198.
    20. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Rey-Bellet, Luc, 2021. "Positive feedback in coordination games: Stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 355-373.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:60:y:2015:i:c:p:40-48. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.