IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/feemcl/127443.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Regulating Global Biodiversity: What is the Problem?

Author

Listed:
  • Swanson, Timothy
  • Groom, Ben

Abstract

We distinguish between local problems of biodiversity loss and global ones, where international cooperation is required. Global biodiversity regulation involves choosing the optimal stopping rule regarding global land conversions, in order to ensure that some areas of unconverted natural reserves remain to support the production sector that exists on converted lands. The basic difficulty with implementing a solution to this global problem lies in the asymmetry in endowments between those states that have previously converted, and those that have not. We demonstrate that the fundamental problem of global biodiversity regulation is similar to the bargaining problem analysed by Nash, Rubinstein and others. There are benefits from global land conversion, and there must be agreement on their distribution before the conversion process can be halted. Since the institutions addressing global biodiversity problems are either highly ineffectual (benefit sharing agreements, prior informed consent clauses) or very extreme (incremental cost contracts), the biodiversity bargaining problem remains unresolved. For this reason we anticipate that suboptimal conversions will continue to occur, as a way of protesting the ineffective and unfair approaches employed in addressing this problem to date.

Suggested Citation

  • Swanson, Timothy & Groom, Ben, 2012. "Regulating Global Biodiversity: What is the Problem?," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 127443, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemcl:127443
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.127443
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/127443/files/NDL2012-031.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.127443?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sarr, Mare & Goeschl, Timo & Swanson, Tim, 2008. "The value of conserving genetic resources for R&D: A survey," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 184-193, September.
    2. Timo Goeschl & Timothy Swanson, 2002. "The Social Value of Biodiversity for R&D," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(4), pages 477-504, August.
    3. Daan van Soest & Robert Lensink, 2000. "Foreign Transfers and Tropical Deforestation: What Terms of Conditionality?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(2), pages 389-399.
    4. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    5. Rupert Gatti & Timo Goeschl & Ben Groom & Timothy Swanson, 2011. "The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 48(4), pages 609-628, April.
    6. Swanson, Timothy, 1996. "The reliance of northern economies on southern biodiversity: biodiversity as information," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-8, April.
    7. Mare Sarr & Tim Swanson, 2011. "Intellectual Property and Biodiversity: When and Where are Property Rights Important?," Working Papers 2011.79, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Angelsen, Arild & Kaimowitz, David, 1999. "Rethinking the Causes of Deforestation: Lessons from Economic Models," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 14(1), pages 73-98, February.
    9. Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1247-1280, November.
    10. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    11. Labbate, Gabriel, 2008. "The incremental cost principle and the conservation of globally important habitats: A critical examination," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 216-224, April.
    12. Timothy M. Swanson, 1994. "The International Regulation of Extinction," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-12985-0, March.
    13. Southgate, Douglas & Salazar-Canelos, Pablo & Camacho-Saa, Carlos & Stewart, Rigoberto, 2000. "Markets, Institutions, and Forestry: The Consequences of Timber Trade Liberalization in Ecuador," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 2005-2012, November.
    14. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Innovation, Technology Transfer, and the World Distribution of Income," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 253-266, April.
    15. Pranab Bardhan & Nirvikar Singh, 1987. "On Moral Hazard and Cost Sharing under Sharecropping," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 69(2), pages 382-383.
    16. Scott Barrett, 1994. "The biodiversity supergame," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 111-122, February.
    17. R. J. Smith & R. D. J. Muir & M. J. Walpole & A. Balmford & N. Leader-Williams, 2003. "Governance and the loss of biodiversity," Nature, Nature, vol. 426(6962), pages 67-70, November.
    18. Copeland, Brian R., 1990. "Strategic enhancement and destruction of fisheries and the environment in the presence of international externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 213-226, November.
    19. J. C. H. Jones & Tanya Potashnik & Anming Zhang, 2001. "Patents, brand-generic competition and the pricing of ethical drugs in Canada: some empirical evidence from British Columbia, 1981-1994," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(7), pages 947-956.
    20. Polasky, Stephen & Costello, Christopher & McAusland, Carol, 2004. "On trade, land-use, and biodiversity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 911-925, September.
    21. John K. Stranlund, 1999. "Sunk Capital and Negotiated Resolutions of Environmental Conflicts," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 75(1), pages 142-155.
    22. Sergio Margulis, 2004. "Causes of Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15060.
    23. Timo Goeschl & Timothy Swanson, 2003. "On Biology and Technology: The Economics of Managing Biotechnologies," Working Papers 2003.42, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    24. Susanne Droege & Birgit Soete, 2001. "Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, North-South Trade, and Biological Diversity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(2), pages 149-163, June.
    25. Jerrell Richer & John K. Stranlund, 1997. "Threat Positions and the Resolution of Environmental Conflicts," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 73(1), pages 58-71.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    2. Irene Alvarado-Quesada & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2017. "International Environmental Agreements for biodiversity conservation: a game-theoretic analysis," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 731-754, October.
    3. Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Nentjes, Andries, 2020. "Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rupert Gatti & Timo Goeschl & Ben Groom & Timothy Swanson, 2011. "The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 48(4), pages 609-628, April.
    2. Timothy Swanson & Ben Groom, 2012. "Regulating Biodiversity: What is the Problem?," CIES Research Paper series 08-2012, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
    3. Tapio Palokangas, 2017. "Regulation versus subsidies in conservation with a self-interested policy maker," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 19(1), pages 183-196, January.
    4. Winands, Sarah & Holm-Müller, Karin & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2013. "The biodiversity conservation game with heterogeneous countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 14-23.
    5. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2016. "Coaseian biodiversity conservation. Who benefits?," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145745, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Wenjuan Cheng & Alessio D’Amato & Giacomo Pallante, 2020. "Benefit sharing mechanisms for agricultural genetic diversity use and on-farm conservation," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 37(1), pages 337-355, April.
    7. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2019. "Coaseian Biodiversity Conservation and Market Power," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(3), pages 849-873, March.
    8. Stranlund, John K., 1999. "Bargaining to preserve a unique ecosystem: the role of anticipatory investments to establish stronger bargaining positions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 425-437, December.
    9. Lebdioui, Amir, 2022. "Nature-inspired innovation policy: Biomimicry as a pathway to leverage biodiversity for economic development," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    10. Scharpf, Fritz W. & Mohr, Matthias, 1994. "Efficient self-coordination in policy networks: A simulation study," MPIfG Discussion Paper 94/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    11. Lin, Hwan C., 2010. "Technology diffusion and global welfare effects: Imitative R&D vs. South-bound FDI," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 231-247, November.
    12. Hitoshi Tanaka & Tatsuro Iwaisako, 2009. "Product cycles, endogenous skill acquisition, and wage inequality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(1), pages 300-331, February.
    13. Yang, Guifang & Maskus, Keith E., 2001. "Intellectual property rights, licensing, and innovation in an endogenous product-cycle model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 169-187, February.
    14. Gino A.Gancia, 2003. "Globalization, Divergence and Stagnation," Development Working Papers 174, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    15. Pol Antràs, 2005. "Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1054-1073, September.
    16. Borota, Teodora, 2010. "Innovation and Imitation in a Model of North-South TradeRecent evidence on world trade patterns reveals North-South specialization across," Working Paper Series 2010:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    17. Shady S. Atallah & Miguel I. Gómez & Jon M. Conrad, 2017. "Specification of Spatial-Dynamic Externalities and Implications for Strategic Behavior in Disease Control," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 93(2), pages 209-229.
    18. Fraser, Iain & Chisholm, Tony, 2000. "Conservation or cultural heritage? Cattle grazing in the Victoria Alpine National Park," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 63-75, April.
    19. Lai, Edwin L. -C., 1998. "International intellectual property rights protection and the rate of product innovation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 133-153, February.
    20. Glass, Amy Jocelyn & Saggi, Kamal, 2002. "Intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 387-410, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:feemcl:127443. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.