Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.06.004
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Cremer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007.
"Optimal search auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 226-248, May.
- Charles Zhoucheng Zheng & Jacques Cremer & Yossef Spiegel, 2004. "Optimal search auctions," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 615, Econometric Society.
- Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Z., 2005. "Optimal Search Auctions," IDEI Working Papers 293, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Optimal Search Auctions," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12662, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng, 2005. "Optimal Search Auctions," Discussion Papers 1421, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007.
"Information structures in optimal auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Martin Pesendorfer, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1323, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Péter Eső & Balázs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007.
"Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 355-372, June.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Auctions and Informaton Acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Post-Print halshs-00754227, HAL.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Auctions and Informaton Acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754227, HAL.
- Hagedorn, Marcus, 2009. "The value of information for auctioneers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2197-2208, September.
- Vagstad, Steinar, 2007.
"Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 597-614, June.
- Vagstad, S., 2001. "Should Auctioneers Supply Early Information for Prospective Bidders?," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0701, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Jacques Crémer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Zheng, 2009.
"Auctions with costly information acquisition,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 41-72, January.
- Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12709, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2002.
"Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1007-1033, May.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Vaimaki, 2000. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1248, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Nicola Persico, 2000.
"Information Acquisition in Auctions,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 135-148, January.
- Nicola Persico, 1997. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 762, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Chade, Hector & Schlee, Edward, 2002. "Another Look at the Radner-Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 421-452, December.
- Juan-JosÈ Ganuza & JosÈ S. Penalva, 2010. "Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 1007-1030, May.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024. "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Working Papers 365, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Wu, Haoyang, 2022. "A type-adjustable mechanism where the designer may obtain more payoffs by optimally controlling distributions of agents' types," MPRA Paper 113150, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024. "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Papers 2412.12676, arXiv.org.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Shi, Xianwen, 2012.
"Optimal auctions with information acquisition,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 666-686.
- Xianwen Shi, 2007. "Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition," Working Papers tecipa-302, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Hagedorn, Marcus, 2009. "The value of information for auctioneers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2197-2208, September.
- Nikandrova, Arina & Pancs, Romans, 2017. "Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 174-212.
- Rieck, Thomas, 2010. "Signaling in First-Price Auctions," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 18/2010, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
- Todd Kaplan, 2012.
"Communication of preferences in contests for contracts,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 487-503, October.
- Kaplan, Todd R, 2008. "Communication of Preferences in Contests for Contracts," MPRA Paper 18696, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Aug 2009.
- Chen, Yan & He, YingHua, 2021. "Information acquisition and provision in school choice: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
- Li, Yunan, 2019. "Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 279-328.
- Jacques Crémer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Zheng, 2009.
"Auctions with costly information acquisition,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 41-72, January.
- Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12709, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Vitali Gretschko & Jasmina Simon, 2024. "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism with Covert Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_616, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Yan Chen & YingHua He, 2022. "Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 293-327, July.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007.
"Information structures in optimal auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Martin Pesendorfer, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1323, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024. "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Papers 2412.12676, arXiv.org.
- Anne-Katrin Roesler & Balázs Szentes, 2017.
"Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 2072-2080, July.
- Roesler, Anne-Katrin & Szentes, Balázs, 2017. "Buyer-optimal learning and monopoly pricing," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 84061, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2014.
"Information acquisition during a descending auction,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 731-751, April.
- Wambach, Achim, 2008. "Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction," CEPR Discussion Papers 7023, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011.
"The insider's curse,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
- Angel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider's Curse," Microeconomics 0503012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Yunan Li, 2017. "Efficient Mechanisms with Information Acquisition," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Jun 2017.
- Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024. "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Working Papers 365, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Gottardi, Piero, 2014.
"Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 24-44.
- Antonio Cabrales & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies," Working Papers 2008_37, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Antonio Cabrales & Piero Gottardi, 2009. "Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/11, European University Institute.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Gottardi, Piero, 2008. "Markets for information : of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies," UC3M Working papers. Economics we080201, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Antonio Cabrales & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies," CESifo Working Paper Series 2336, CESifo.
- Lang, Ruitian, 2019. "Try before you buy: A theory of dynamic information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1057-1093.
More about this item
Keywords
Asymmetric information; Information costs; Information release; Auctions;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:462-469. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.