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The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)

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  • Mr. Olivier D Jeanne
  • Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Abstract

Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the IMF cannot cause moral hazard, as argued by Michael Mussa (1999, 2004). It follows that examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing costs is not a useful strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. Instead, empirical research on moral hazard should focus on the assumptions of the Mussa theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Olivier D Jeanne & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2004. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Working Papers 2004/192, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2004/192
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, 2006. "Odious Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 82-92, March.
    2. Michael Mussa, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.),Capital Flows and the International Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    3. Vreeland,James Raymond, 2003. "The IMF and Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016957, January.
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    5. Olivier Jeanne, 2009. "Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2135-2148, December.
    6. Ms. Edda Zoli, 2004. "Credit Rationing in Emerging Economies' Access to Global Capital Markets," IMF Working Papers 2004/070, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Mr. Steven T Phillips & Mr. Timothy D. Lane, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 2000/168, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Eduardo Borensztein & Paolo Mauro, 2004. "The case for GDP-indexed bonds [‘World income components: measuring and exploiting risk-sharing opportunities’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 19(38), pages 166-216.
    9. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
    10. Steven B. Kamin, 2002. "Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets," International Finance Discussion Papers 736, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Ms. Isabel Schnabel, 2002. "Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test," IMF Working Papers 2002/181, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Leszek Balcerowicz, 2010. "Sovereign Bankruptcy in the European Union in the Comparative Perspective," Working Paper Series WP10-18, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    2. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2006. "Catalytic finance: When does it work?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 161-177, September.
    3. Kim Oosterlinck & Loredana Ureche-Rangau, 2008. "Multiple Potential Payers and Sovereign Bond Prices," Finance, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, vol. 29(1), pages 31-52.
    4. Lee, Jong-Wha & Shin, Kwanho, 2008. "IMF bailouts and moral hazard," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 816-830, September.
    5. Fernández, Raquel & Martín, Alberto, 2014. "The Long and the Short of It: Sovereign Debt Crises and Debt Maturity," CEPR Discussion Papers 10322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Boz, Emine, 2011. "Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 70-82, January.
    7. Li, Larry & Sy, Malick & McMurray, Adela, 2015. "Insights into the IMF bailout debate: A review and research agenda," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 891-914.
    8. Flores Zendejas, Juan & Gaillard, Norbert, 2021. "The International Lender of Last Resort Between Scylla and Charybdis," Working Papers unige:152743, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.
    9. Yves Mersch, 2013. "Default of Systemically Important Financial Intermediaries: Short-Term Stability vs. Incentive Compatability," Chapters, in: Andreas Dombret & Otto Lucius (ed.), Stability of the Financial System, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Nada Azmy Elberry & Frank Naert & Stijn Goeminne, 2023. "Optimal public debt composition during debt crises: A review of theoretical literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 351-376, April.
    11. J. Brandes & Tobias Schüle, 2008. "IMF’s assistance: Devil’s kiss or guardian angel?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 63-86, June.
    12. Castillo, José A. & Mora-Valencia, Andrés & Perote, Javier, 2018. "Moral hazard and default risk of SMEs with collateralized loans," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 95-99.
    13. Noy, Ilan, 2008. "Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 64-78, February.
    14. Gong Cheng & Dominika Miernik & Teuta Turani, 2020. "Finding complementarities in IMF and RFA toolkits," Discussion Papers 8, European Stability Mechanism, revised 25 Oct 2021.
    15. Raghuram G. Rajan & Ioannis Tokatlidis, 2005. "Dollar Shortages and Crises," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(2), September.
    16. Hossain, Monzur & Yoshino, Naoyuki & Taghizadeh-Hesary, Farhad, 2021. "Default risks, moral hazard and market-based solution: Evidence from renewable energy market in Bangladesh," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 489-499.
    17. Evrensel, Ayse Y. & Kim, Jong Sung, 2006. "Macroeconomic policies and participation in IMF programs," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 264-281, October.
    18. Sergio Masciantonio, 2005. "The Role of Preference Structure and Moral Hazard in a Multiple Equilibria. Model of Financial Crises," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 95(6), pages 135-165, November-.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    WP; IMF lending; debtor country; emerging market;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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