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Default of Systemically Important Financial Intermediaries: Short-Term Stability vs. Incentive Compatability

In: Stability of the Financial System

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  • Yves Mersch

Abstract

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, new financial market regulation is being implemented, and increasing numbers of countries are establishing new legislation for macroprudential oversight. Against this backdrop, this thought provoking book provides a platform for the leading international experts to discuss and encourage future debate on financial stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Yves Mersch, 2013. "Default of Systemically Important Financial Intermediaries: Short-Term Stability vs. Incentive Compatability," Chapters, in: Andreas Dombret & Otto Lucius (ed.), Stability of the Financial System, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15454_11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin Čihák & Alexander Tieman, 2011. "Quality of Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision Around the World," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2009. "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2201-2238, June.
    3. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 215-268, November.
    4. Jin, Xisong & Nadal De Simone, Francisco de A., 2014. "Banking systemic vulnerabilities: A tail-risk dynamic CIMDO approach," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 14(C), pages 81-101.
    5. Barth, James R. & Caprio,Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "The regulation and supervision of banks around the world - a new database," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2588, The World Bank.
    6. Erlend Nier & Mr. Luis Ignacio Jácome & Jacek Osinski & Pamela Madrid, 2011. "Towards Effective Macroprudential Policy Frameworks: An Assessment of Stylized Institutional Models," IMF Working Papers 2011/250, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-5.
    8. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Karacaovali, Baybars & Laeven, Luc, 2005. "Deposit insurance around the world : a comprehensive database," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3628, The World Bank.
    9. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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