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Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard

In: Capital Flows and the International Financial System

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  • Michael Mussa

    (International Monetary Fund)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Michael Mussa, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.),Capital Flows and the International Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    • Handle: RePEc:rba:rbaacv:acv1999-13
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    File URL: https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/1999/pdf/mussa.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Country Insurance," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-6.
    2. Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 2, pages 1-41.
    3. Noy, Ilan, 2008. "Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 64-78, February.
    4. Reynaud, Julien & Vauday, Julien, 2009. "Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 139-162, May.
    5. Rockerbie, Duane W. & Easton, Stephen T., 2009. "Commercial banks, default insurance and IMF reforms," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-39, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    6. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    7. Prasanna Gai & Ashley Taylor, 2004. "International Financial Rescues and Debtor‐Country Moral Hazard," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 391-420, December.
    8. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    9. Gong Cheng & Dominika Miernik & Teuta Turani, 2020. "Finding complementarities in IMF and RFA toolkits," Discussion Papers 8, European Stability Mechanism, revised 25 Oct 2021.
    10. Peter Clark & Haizhou Huang, 2006. "International Financial Contagion and the Fund —A Theoretical Framework," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 399-422, December.
    11. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-5.
    12. Martin Brooke & Rhys R. Mendes & Alex Pienkowski & Eric Santor, 2013. "Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Discussion Papers 13-3, Bank of Canada.
    13. Reynaud, Julien & Vauday, Julien, 2008. "IMF lending and geopolitics," Working Paper Series 965, European Central Bank.
    14. Brooke, Martin & Pienkowski, Alex & Mendes, Rhys & Santor, Eric, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 27: Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 27, Bank of England.
    15. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 408-432.
    16. Ms. Priyadarshani Joshi & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "Implicit Transfers in IMF Lending, 1973–2003," IMF Working Papers 2005/008, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Mr. Jonathan David Ostry & Mr. Olivier D Jeanne, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 2008/236, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Flores Zendejas, Juan & Gaillard, Norbert, 2021. "The International Lender of Last Resort Between Scylla and Charybdis," Working Papers unige:152743, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.
    19. Morris Goldstein, 2000. "Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: Where Do We Stand?," Working Paper Series WP00-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    20. Mr. Jun I Kim, 2007. "Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard," IMF Working Papers 2007/104, International Monetary Fund.
    21. Mr. Peter B. Clark & Mr. Haizhou Huang, 2001. "International Financial Contagion and the IMF: A Theoretical Framework," IMF Working Papers 2001/137, International Monetary Fund.

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