Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard
In: Capital Flows and the International Financial System
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- Julien Vauday & Julien Reynaud, 2009. "Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01330210, HAL.
- Julien Reynaud & Julien Vauday, 2009. "Geopolitics and International Organizations? An Empirical Study on IMF Facilities," Post-Print hal-00367845, HAL.
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- Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005.
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- Mr. Olivier D Jeanne & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2004. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Working Papers 2004/192, International Monetary Fund.
- Martin Brooke & Rhys R. Mendes & Alex Pienkowski & Eric Santor, 2013. "Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Discussion Papers 13-3, Bank of Canada.
- Reynaud, Julien & Vauday, Julien, 2008. "IMF lending and geopolitics," Working Paper Series 965, European Central Bank.
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- Morris Goldstein, 2000. "Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: Where Do We Stand?," Working Paper Series WP00-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Mr. Jun I Kim, 2007. "Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard," IMF Working Papers 2007/104, International Monetary Fund.
- Mr. Peter B. Clark & Mr. Haizhou Huang, 2001. "International Financial Contagion and the IMF: A Theoretical Framework," IMF Working Papers 2001/137, International Monetary Fund.
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Keywords
moral hazard in Asian crisis economies; international financial architecture;Statistics
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