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Multiple potential payers and sovereign bond prices

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  • Kim Oosterlinck
  • Loredana Ureche-Rangau

Abstract

Sovereign bonds are usually priced under the assumption that only the sovereign issuer may be responsible of their repayment. In some cases however, bondholders may legitimately expect to be repaid by more than one agent. For example, when a country breaks-up, successor states may agree to recognize their responsibility for part of the debt. Other extreme events, such as repudiations, may lead (and have led) bondholders to consider several bailout candidates at the same point in time. This paper first discusses the theoretical financial implications stemming from an infrequent and challenging situation, namely the existence of multiple potential payers. Then, through a historical precedent, the 1918 Russian repudiation, the paper confirms that the existence of multiple potential payers has a diversification effect which lowers the volatility of the bond price and increases its value. These results are strengthened by a comparison with a closely related standard case of default.
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  • Kim Oosterlinck & Loredana Ureche-Rangau, 2008. "Multiple potential payers and sovereign bond prices," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/14301, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/14301
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernal, Oscar & Oosterlinck, Kim & Szafarz, Ariane, 2010. "Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1193-1205, November.
    2. Roumen Avramov & Dragana Gnjatovic, 2008. "Stabilization Policies in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia During Communism's Terminal Years : 1980s Economic Visions in Retrospect," Working Papers 81, Bank of Greece.
    3. Yuksel Gormez, 2008. "Banking in Turkey: History and Evolution," Working Papers 83, Bank of Greece.
    4. Sophia Lazaretou, 2008. "Banking and Central Banking in Pre-WWII Grecce: Money and Currency Developments," Working Papers 86, Bank of Greece.
    5. Stephan Barisitz, 2008. "Banking Transformation (1989 - 2006) in Central and Eastern Europe - With Special Reference to Balkans," Working Papers 78, Bank of Greece.
    6. Zarko Lazarevic, 2008. "Banking Performance in South-Eastern Europe During the Interwar Period," Working Papers 79, Bank of Greece.
    7. Apostolides, Alexander, 2008. "“How Similar to South-Eastern Europe were the Islands of Cyprus and Malta in terms of Agricultural Output and Credit? Evidence during the Interwar Period”," MPRA Paper 9968, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Milan Sojic & Ljiljana Djurdjevic, 2008. "Monetary Policy Objectives and Istruments used by the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia (1884 - 1914)," Working Papers 87, Bank of Greece.
    9. Mitchener, Kris James & Oosterlinck, Kim & Weidenmier, Marc D. & Haber, Stephen, 2015. "Victory or repudiation? Predicting winners in civil wars using international financial markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 310-319.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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