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Discrimination in the patent system: Evidence from standard-essential patents

Author

Listed:
  • Gaetan de Rassenfosse

    (Ecole polytechnique federale de Lausanne)

  • Emilio Raiteri

    (Eindhoven University of Technology)

  • Rudi Bekkers

    (Eindhoven University of Technology)

Abstract

This paper tests for traces of discrimination against foreigners in the patent system. It focuses on patent applications filed in China, and for which the owner has made a public disclosure that they are or may become essential to the implementation of a technical standard. Such potentially standard-essential patents are of particularly high importance to their owner. We use the timing of disclosure to a leading standard-setting organization as a source of econometric identification and carry out extensive tests to ensure the exogeneity of timing. We find that foreign patent applications are significantly less likely to be granted by the Chinese patent office if their owners disclose them to be potentially essential to a standard before the substantive examination starts. Furthermore, the patent office spends, on average, one more year on the examination of such patents, and the scope of the patents are also more extensively reduced. Our findings contribute to the emerging discussion on technology protectionism.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaetan de Rassenfosse & Emilio Raiteri & Rudi Bekkers, 2023. "Discrimination in the patent system: Evidence from standard-essential patents," Working Papers 21, Chair of Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:iip:wpaper:21
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    discrimination; indigenous innovation; national treatment principle; standard-essential patent; technology protectionism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F68 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - Policy
    • K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment

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