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Optimal patentability requirements with complementary innovations

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  • Denicolò, Vincenzo
  • Halmenschlager, Christine

Abstract

We study optimal patent design, contrasting the case that two or more innovations are needed to operate a new technology with the traditional case that a single innovation is directly commercialisable. The major finding is that with complementary innovations the patentability requirements should be stronger than in the case of stand-alone innovation. This reduces the fragmentation of intellectual property, which is socially costly. However, to preserve the incentives to innovate, if a patent is granted the strength of protection should be generally higher than in the stand-alone case.

Suggested Citation

  • Denicolò, Vincenzo & Halmenschlager, Christine, 2012. "Optimal patentability requirements with complementary innovations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 190-204.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:2:p:190-204
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.09.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Emilio Raiteri & Rudi Bekkers, 2023. "Discrimination in the Patent System: Evidence from Standard-Essential Patents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(4), pages 739-763.
    2. Annalisa Biagi & Vincenzo Denicolò, 2014. "Timing of Discovery and the Division of Profit With Complementary Innovations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 89-102, March.
    3. Wipusanawan, Chayanin, 2023. "Standard-essential patents, innovation, and competition," Other publications TiSEM 292e319a-9e6a-4465-8f8f-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patents; Complementary innovations; Patentability requirements; Fragmentation of intellectual property rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

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