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Pre-grant patent publication and cumulative innovation

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  • Aoki, Reiko
  • Spiegel, Yossi

Abstract

We examine the implications of pre-grant publication (PP) of patent applications in the context of a cumulative innovation model. We show that PP leads to fewer applications and fewer inventions, but it may raise the probability that new technologies will reach the product market and thereby enhances consumer surplus and possibly total welfare as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Aoki, Reiko & Spiegel, Yossi, 2009. "Pre-grant patent publication and cumulative innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 333-345, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:3:p:333-345
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard Ganglmair & Emanuele Tarantino, 2014. "Conversation with secrets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 273-302, June.
    2. Drivas, Kyriakos & Lei, Zhen & Wright, Brian D., 2018. "Application publication or confirmation of grant: Which matters more for academic technology transfer?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 204-228.
    3. Jeon, Haejun, 2019. "Licensing and information disclosure under asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 276(1), pages 314-330.
    4. Jürgen Mihm & Fabian J. Sting & Tan Wang, 2015. "On the Effectiveness of Patenting Strategies in Innovation Races," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(11), pages 2662-2684, November.
    5. Ponce, Carlos J., 2011. "Knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights protection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 418-434.
    6. Zaby, Alexandra, 2020. "Safe harbors for patent infringers: sequential innovation under incomplete patent protection," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224653, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. ICHIDA Toshihiro, 2013. "Imitation versus Innovation Costs: Patent policies under common patent length," Discussion papers 13054, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    8. Johannes Koenen & Martin Peitz, 2012. "The Economics of Pending Patents," Chapters, in: Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Guijie Zhang & Guang Yu & Yuqiang Feng & Luning Liu & Zhenhua Yang, 2017. "Improving the publication delay model to characterize the patent granting process," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 111(2), pages 621-637, May.
    10. Farzad Saidi & Alminas Žaldokas, 2021. "How Does Firms’ Innovation Disclosure Affect Their Banking Relationships?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 742-768, February.
    11. Deepak Hegde & Hong Luo, 2018. "Patent Publication and the Market for Ideas," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 652-672, February.
    12. Pavel Kocourek, 2021. "Revealing Private Information in a Patent Race," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp693, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    13. KADOWAKI Makoto & NAGAOKA Sadao, 2024. "Early Disclosure and Patent Value: How do you know that you are a pioneer?," Discussion papers 24050, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    14. Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Emilio Raiteri & Rudi Bekkers, 2023. "Discrimination in the Patent System: Evidence from Standard-Essential Patents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(4), pages 739-763.
    15. Okada, Yoshimi & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2020. "Effects of early patent publication on knowledge dissemination: Evidence from U.S. patent law reform," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    16. Fei Yu & Yanrui Wu & Jin Chen & Arie Lewin, 2022. "Technological Leapfrogging and Strategic Patent Policy," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 22-17, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    17. Kim, Jinhwan & Valentine, Kristen, 2021. "The innovation consequences of mandatory patent disclosures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2).
    18. Gehrig, Thomas & Stenbacka, Rune, 2021. "Journal competition and the quality of published research: Simultaneous versus sequential screening," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    19. Heger, Diana & Zaby, Alexandra K., 2012. "Giving away the game? The impact of the disclosure effect on the patenting decision," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-010, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    20. Fei Yu & Yanrui Wu & Jin Chen & Arie Y. Lewin, 2023. "Technological leapfrogging and country strategic patent policy," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 54(5), pages 887-909, July.
    21. Jonathan B. Baker, 2016. "Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms, R&D Competition, and Innovation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(3), pages 269-287, May.
    22. Saidi, Farzad & Zaldokas, Alminas, 2016. "Patents as Substitutes for Relationships," CEPR Discussion Papers 11580, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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