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Standard-Essential Patents

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  • Lerner, Josh
  • Tirole, Jean

Abstract

A major policy issue in standard setting is that patents that are ex-ante not that important may, by being included into a standard, become standard-essential patents (SEPs). In an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create, most standard-setting organizations require the owners of patents covered by the standard to make a loose commitment to grant licenses on reasonable terms. Such commitments unsurprisingly are conducive to intense litigation activity. This paper builds a framework for the analysis of SEPs, identifies several types of ine¢ ciencies attached to the lack of price commitment, shows how structured price commitments restore competition, and analyzes whether price commitments are likely to emerge in the marketplace.

Suggested Citation

  • Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2013. "Standard-Essential Patents," TSE Working Papers 13-441, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised 13 Mar 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:27714
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Standards; licensing commitments; standard-essential patents; royalty stacking; FRAND; hold ups and reverse hold ups;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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