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An Informational Basis for Voting Rules

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  • Alexander V. Karpov

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper presents a novel combinatorial approach for voting rule analysis. Applying reversal symmetry, we introduce a new class of preference profiles and a new representation (bracelet representation). By applying an impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model for the case of three alternatives, we obtain precise theoretical values for the number of voting situations for the plurality rule, the run-off rule, the Kemeny rule, the Borda rule, and the scoring rules in the extreme case. From enumerative combinatorics, we obtain an information utilization index for these rules. The main results are obtained for the case of three alternative

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander V. Karpov, 2018. "An Informational Basis for Voting Rules," HSE Working papers WP BRP 188/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:188/ec/2018
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    File URL: https://wp.hse.ru/data/2018/04/04/1164595187/188EC2018.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raúl Pérez-Fernández & Bernard De Baets, 2017. "Recursive Monotonicity of the Scorix: Borda Meets Condorcet," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 793-813, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ANEC; IANC; plurality; run-off; Kemeny; Borda; scoring rules; reversal symmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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