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Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice

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  • Stergios Athanasoglou
  • Somouaoga Bonkoungou

Abstract

We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. We propose a novel family of neutral and strategy-proof rules, which we call sequential unanimity rules. By demonstrating their formal equivalence to the M-winning coalition rules of Moulin (1983), we show that sequential unanimity rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness. We establish our results by developing algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The analysis can be extended to accommodate the full preference domain in which voters may be indifferent between candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • Stergios Athanasoglou & Somouaoga Bonkoungou, 2024. "Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice," Papers 2402.13009, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2402.13009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laurent Bartholdi & Wade Hann‐Caruthers & Maya Josyula & Omer Tamuz & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Equitable Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 563-589, March.
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    6. Achille Basile & Surekha Rao & K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, 2022. "Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 807-826, April.
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