Report NEP-DES-2018-04-23

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2102, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
• David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2018. "Comparative Statics in the Multiple-Partners Assignment Game," Working Papers 1036, Barcelona School of Economics.
• HORAN, Sean & OSBORNE, Martin J. & SANVER, M. Remzi, 2018. "Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives," Cahiers de recherche 2018-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
• Bowen, T. Renee & Anesi, Vincent, 2018. "Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 12797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Alexander V. Karpov, 2018. "An Informational Basis for Voting Rules," HSE Working papers WP BRP 188/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
• Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2018. "The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule," Working Papers hal-01757742, HAL.