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Level $$r$$ r consensus and stable social choice

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  • Muhammad Mahajne
  • Shmuel Nitzan
  • Oscar Volij

Abstract

We propose the concept of level $$r$$ r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is shown that if a preference profile exhibits level $$r$$ r consensus around a given preference relation, there exists a Condorcet winner. In addition, if the number of individuals is odd the majority relation coincides with the preference relation around which there is such consensus and consequently it is transitive. Furthermore, if the level of consensus is sufficiently strong, the Condorcet winner is chosen by all the scoring rules. Level $$r$$ r consensus therefore ensures the Condorcet consistency of all scoring rules, thus eliminating the tension between decision rules inspired by ranking-based utilitarianism and the majority rule. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Muhammad Mahajne & Shmuel Nitzan & Oscar Volij, 2015. "Level $$r$$ r consensus and stable social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 805-817, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:805-817
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0882-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mahajne, Muhammad & Volij, Oscar, 2022. "Pairwise consensus and the Borda rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 17-21.
    2. Diss, Mostapha & Mahajne, Muhammad, 2020. "Social acceptability of Condorcet committees," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 14-27.
    3. Nikolay L. Poliakov, 2016. "Note on level r consensus," Papers 1606.04816, arXiv.org.

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    Keywords

    D71;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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